鑽石舞台

北京時間8月26日晚間，美聯儲主席鮑威爾在傑克遜霍爾會議上短短十分鐘的「鷹派」發言徹底擊碎了投資者對央行轉鴿的預期——

鮑威爾演講中明確表態，美聯儲不會被一兩個月的數據所左右，當前美國的通脹形勢仍然嚴峻，美聯儲「必須堅持加息，直至大功告成」。同時，鮑威爾直接反駁了貨幣市場對2023年下半年開始降息的定價。這番表態後，市場對9月美聯儲加息75個基點的預期瞬間飆升至60%附近。

鮑威爾強調，物價穩定是美聯儲的職責所在，也是美國經濟的基石。他表示，美聯儲將繼續「有力地使用我們的工具」，來應對仍在40多年來高位附近徘徊的通脹。

鮑威爾稱，FOMC吸收了過去的三個重要教訓：第一，央行能夠而且應當承擔起實現低且穩定的通脹的責任；第二，公眾對通脹的預期應該被納入利率決策考量；第三，必須堅持加息，直至大功告成。

「這些經驗教訓在指導我們使用工具來降低通貨膨脹。我們正在採取有力而迅速的措施來調節需求，使其更好地與供給保持一致，並穩定通脹預期。我們將繼續努力，直到我們有信心完成這項工作。「鮑威爾總結。

鮑威爾此番在央行年會上的講話雖然簡短，卻異常直接。相關分析指出，在美聯儲以及鮑威爾面臨着如何在控制通脹的同時，避免過度衝擊經濟及就業市場的巨大挑戰之際，該演講旨在鞏固美聯儲以及鮑威爾自身的信譽，確保金融市場以及美國民眾相信美聯儲不會讓通脹進一步失控——尤其是在最初時，美聯儲曾誤判本輪通脹，稱其只是「暫時」。

受此影響，全球避險情緒陡然升溫，美股市場慘遭猛烈拋售。美國三大股指在鮑威爾講話後大幅跳水，全線一路暴跌。截至26日收盤，道指跌3.03%，報32283.4點；標普500指數跌3.37%，報4057.66點；納指跌3.94%，報12141.71點。

分析人士認為，儘管市場此前對鮑威爾的強硬立場已有一定預期，但仍有投資者較為樂觀地期望美聯儲激進的加息行動會有所放緩，而鮑威爾在會議上的表態則徹底擊碎了這種期望。

在去年的傑克遜霍爾會議上，我曾討論過廣泛的話題，比如不斷變化的經濟結構，以及在高度不確定性下實施貨幣政策的挑戰。今天，我的講話將會更簡短，更聚焦，傳達的訊息也更直接。

當前，聯邦公開市場委員會（FOMC）的重中之重是將通脹降低至2%的目標。物價穩定是美聯儲的職責所在，也是我們經濟的基石。沒有價格穩定，經濟不再普惠於大眾。特別是，如果沒有價格穩定，持久而強勁的勞動力市場狀況也無法惠及所有人。高通脹的負擔將最沉重地砸在那些最無力承受的人肩上。

恢復價格穩定需要一段時間，需要強力地運用我們的工具，使需求和供給更好地平衡。降低通脹可能需要經濟保持一段持續低於趨勢增長率的時期。此外，勞動力市場狀況很可能也會有所走軟。雖然利率上升、經濟增長放緩和就業市場疲軟會降低通脹，但也會給家庭和企業帶來一些痛苦。這些都是降低通脹的不幸代價。然而，恢復價格穩定失敗將意味着更大的痛苦。

美國經濟增長率從2021年的歷史高水平開始顯著放緩，而去年的增速反映了在疫情衰退後經濟重開的影響。雖然最新的經濟數據好壞參半，但在我看來，我們的經濟繼續顯示出強勁的潛在動能。勞動力市場尤其強勁，但它顯然是失衡的，對工人的需求大大超過了可用工人的供給。通脹率遠高於2%，並且高通脹繼續在經濟中蔓延擴散。儘管7月通脹數據較低令人欣慰，但單月的改善遠低於使FOMC確信通脹正在下降所需的水平。

我們特意將政策立場調整到一個足以限制通脹的水平，以使其恢復到2%。在我們7月份的最近一次會議上，FOMC將聯邦基金利率的目標區間上調至2.25%-2.5%，這是經濟預測摘要（SEP）對聯邦基金利率長期預期水平的估計區間。在目前的情況下，通脹水平遠高於2%，且就業市場極度緊俏，即使在到達對長期中性利率的預計水平後，依然還不是罷手或暫停的時候。

7月份上調目標區間是在多次會議中第二次加息75個基點，我當時說，下次會議時再來一次不尋常的大幅加息可能是合適的。現在休會期大約已經過了一半。我們在9月會議上的決定將取決於所獲得的全部新進數據和不斷演變的前景。在某種程度上，隨着貨幣政策的立場進一步收緊，放緩加息步伐可能會變得合適。

恢復物價穩定可能需要在一段時間內保持限制性的政策立場。歷史記錄對過早放鬆政策提出了強烈警告。委員會成員對6月SEP的最新個人預測顯示，到2023年底，聯邦基金利率中值略低於4%。與會者將在9月的會議上再次更新他們的預測。

美聯儲的貨幣政策審議和決策，建立在我們從1970年代和1980年代高且不穩定的通脹，以及從過去四分之一個世紀低且穩定的通脹中了解到的通脹動態。具體而言，我們吸取到三點重要的教訓。

第一點教訓是，央行能夠而且應當承擔起實現低且穩定的通脹的責任。央行家乃至其他人居然在這兩個方面躊躇不前，現在看來可能很奇怪，但正如前主席本·伯南克所指出的那樣，在大通脹期間，這兩項主張都受到了廣泛質疑。今天，我們認為這兩個問題已有定論。我們實現價格穩定的責任是無條件的。

誠然，目前的高通脹是一種全球現象，世界上許多經濟體面臨的通脹與美國本土一樣高甚至更高。在我看來，美國目前的高通脹確實也是需求強勁和供給受限的產物，而美聯儲的工具主要是針對總需求發揮作用。這一切都沒有削弱美聯儲執行國會賦予我們的實現價格穩定任務的責任。在調節需求使之與供給更加匹配方面，我們顯然還有工作要做。我們致力於完成這項工作。

第二點教訓是，公眾對未來通脹的預期會在設定一段時間內的通脹路徑中發揮重要作用。今天，從很多指標來看，長期通脹預期似乎仍然保持錨定。對家庭、企業和預測人士的調查，以及基於市場的指標，都大致符合這一結論。但這並不是自滿的理由，因為通脹遠超我們的目標已經有一段時間了。

如果公眾預期通脹將在一段時間內保持低且穩定，那麼，在沒有重大衝擊的前提下，它很可能會保持在該水平。不幸的是，對高且不穩定的通脹的預期也是如此。在1970年代，隨着通脹的攀升，對高通脹的預期在家庭和企業的經濟決策中變得根深蒂固。通脹越高，人們就越預期它保持在高位，並將這種信念納入薪資和定價決定。正如前主席保羅·沃爾克在1979年大通脹頂峰時期所說的那樣，「通脹的部分成因在於它自身，所以要讓經濟回歸一個更穩定、生產率更高的狀態，一部分工作是必須擺脫通脹預期的束縛。」

對於實際通脹如何影響對其未來路徑的預期，一個有用的見解是基於「理性忽視」（rational inattention）的概念。當通脹持續走高時，家庭和企業必須密切關注通脹並將之納入經濟決定。當通脹低且穩定時，他們可以更隨心所欲地將注意力放在其他地方。前主席艾倫·格林斯潘是這樣說的：「實際而言，價格穩定意味着平均價格水平的預期變化足夠小、足夠漸進，以至於它們不會對企業和家庭的財務決定產生實質性影響。」

當然，通脹現在是所有人關注的焦點，這凸顯出我們今天面臨的具體風險：目前的高通脹持續的時間越長，對更高通脹的預期就越有可能變得根深蒂固。

這就要談到第三點教訓，即我們必須堅持加息，直至大功告成。歷史表明，隨着時間的推移，降低通脹的就業代價可能會愈發高昂，因為高通脹在薪資和價格制定中變得更加根深蒂固。1980年代初沃爾克成功去通脹之前的15年裡，多次降低通脹的嘗試都失敗了。通過長時間的高度限制性貨幣政策，高通脹才最終得到遏制，並開啟了將通脹降低到低且穩定水平的進程，這樣的「常態」一直延續到去年春天。我們的目標是通過在當下採取堅決的行動，從而避免這樣的結果。

在美聯儲動用工具降低通脹的過程中，這些教訓為我們指引着道路。我們正在採取有力和迅速的措施來調節需求，使其與供給更加匹配，並讓通脹預期保持錨定。我們將繼續努力，直到我們確信工作已經完成。

英文原文如下：

Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today.

At past Jackson Hole conferences, I have discussed broad topics such as the ever- changing structure of the economy and the challenges of conducting monetary policy under high uncertainty. Today, my remarks will be shorter, my focus narrower, and my message more direct.

The Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) overarching focus right now is to bring inflation back down to our 2 percent goal. Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price stability, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all. The burdens of high inflation fall heaviest on those who are least able to bear them.

Restoring price stability will take some time and requires using our tools forcefully to bring demand and supply into better balance. Reducing inflation is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth. Moreover, there will very likely be some softening of labor market conditions. While higher interest rates, slower growth, and softer labor market conditions will bring down inflation, they will also bring some pain to households and businesses. These are the unfortunate costs of reducing inflation. But a failure to restore price stability would mean far greater pain.

The U.S. economy is clearly slowing from the historically high growth rates of 2021, which reflected the reopening of the economy following the pandemic recession. While the latest economic data have been mixed, in my view our economy continues to show strong underlying momentum. The labor market is particularly strong, but it is clearly out of balance, with demand for workers substantially exceeding the supply of available workers. Inflation is running well above 2 percent, and high inflation has continued to spread through the economy. While the lower inflation readings for July are welcome, a single month’s improvement falls far short of what the Committee will need to see before we are confident that inflation is moving down.

We are moving our policy stance purposefully to a level that will be sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. At our most recent meeting in July, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 2.25 to 2.5 percent, which is in the Summary of Economic Projection’s (SEP) range of estimates of where the federal funds rate is projected to settle in the longer run. In current circumstances, with inflation running far above 2 percent and the labor market extremely tight, estimates of longer-run neutral are not a place to stop or pause.

July’s increase in the target range was the second 75 basis point increase in as many meetings, and I said then that another unusually large increase could be appropriate at our next meeting. We are now about halfway through the intermeeting period. Our decision at the September meeting will depend on the totality of the incoming data and the evolving outlook. At some point, as the stance of monetary policy tightens further, it likely will become appropriate to slow the pace of increases.

Restoring price stability will likely require maintaining a restrictive policy stance for some time. The historical record cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. Committee participants』 most recent individual projections from the June SEP showed the median federal funds rate running slightly below 4 percent through the end of 2023. Participants will update their projections at the September meeting.

Our monetary policy deliberations and decisions build on what we have learned about inflation dynamics both from the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, and from the low and stable inflation of the past quarter-century. In particular, we are drawing on three important lessons.

The first lesson is that central banks can and should take responsibility for delivering low and stable inflation. It may seem strange now that central bankers and others once needed convincing on these two fronts, but as former Chairman Ben Bernanke has shown, both propositions were widely questioned during the Great Inflation period. Today, we regard these questions as settled. Our responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. It is true that the current high inflation is a global phenomenon, and that many economies around the world face inflation as high or higher than seen here in the United States. It is also true, in my view, that the current high inflation in the United States is the product of strong demand and constrained supply, and that the Fed’s tools work principally on aggregate demand. None of this diminishes the Federal Reserve’s responsibility to carry out our assigned task of achieving price stability. There is clearly a job to do in moderating demand to better align with supply. We are committed to doing that job.

The second lesson is that the public’s expectations about future inflation can play an important role in setting the path of inflation over time. Today, by many measures, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored. That is broadly true of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, and of market-based measures as well. But that is not grounds for complacency, with inflation having run well above our goal for some time.

If the public expects that inflation will remain low and stable over time, then, absent major shocks, it likely will. Unfortunately, the same is true of expectations of high and volatile inflation. During the 1970s, as inflation climbed, the anticipation of high inflation became entrenched in the economic decisionmaking of households and businesses. The more inflation rose, the more people came to expect it to remain high, and they built that belief into wage and pricing decisions. As former Chairman Paul Volcker put it at the height of the Great Inflation in 1979, 「Inflation feeds in part on itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more productive economy must be to break the grip of inflationary expectations.」

One useful insight into how actual inflation may affect expectations about its future path is based in the concept of 「rational inattention.」 When inflation is persistently high, households and businesses must pay close attention and incorporate inflation into their economic decisions. When inflation is low and stable, they are freer to focus their attention elsewhere. Former Chairman Alan Greenspan put it this way: 「For all practical purposes, price stability means that expected changes in the average price level are small enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household financial decisions.」

Of course, inflation has just about everyone’s attention right now, which highlights a particular risk today: The longer the current bout of high inflation continues, the greater the chance that expectations of higher inflation will become entrenched.

That brings me to the third lesson, which is that we must keep at it until the job is done. History shows that the employment costs of bringing down inflation are likely to increase with delay, as high inflation becomes more entrenched in wage and price setting. The successful Volcker disinflation in the early 1980s followed multiple failed attempts to lower inflation over the previous 15 years. A lengthy period of very restrictive monetary policy was ultimately needed to stem the high inflation and start the process of getting inflation down to the low and stable levels that were the norm until the spring of last year. Our aim is to avoid that outcome by acting with resolve now.

These lessons are guiding us as we use our tools to bring inflation down. We are taking forceful and rapid steps to moderate demand so that it comes into better alignment with supply, and to keep inflation expectations anchored. We will keep at it until we are confident the job is done.