鑽石舞台

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1.多渠道和全渠道零售對實體店的影響

除了傳統的實體店外，大多數零售商還通過在線渠道銷售產品。我們研究了這樣的多渠道或全渠道零售商應該如何決定實體店的數量和規模。研究結果表明，較高的在線購物退貨率可以激勵零售商擁有更少的、規模更大的實體店。隨着在線購物變得更加方便，零售商可能更願意擁有更多規模較小的實體店。我們還研究了涉及不同實體店功能的三種流行的全渠道策略的效果：（i）陳列室只展示產品供客戶在網上購買前檢查，不提供實體店取貨；(ii) 允許客戶在實體店退貨，這種退貨靈活性擴展了實體店的功能；(iii) 允許客戶在線購買在實體店取貨，這種供貨靈活性擴展了實體店功能。結果表明，當實體店被賦予更少（更多）功能時，與陳列室（退貨或取貨靈活性）策略一樣，對於全渠道零售商，增加（減少）實體店的數量和/或規模可能是最佳選擇。

Most retailers today sell products through an online channel in addition to traditional physical stores. We investigate how such a multichannel or omnichannel retailer should decide the number and size of physical stores. We show that a higher return rate for online purchases can incentivize the retailer to have fewer physical stores that are larger in size. As online shopping becomes more convenient, a retailer may prefer to have more physical stores that are smaller in size. We also study the effect of three popular omnichannel strategies that involve changes of the physical stores』 functions: (i) showrooms only display products for customers to inspect before they purchase online, removing fulfillment from physical stores; (ii) return flexibility expands the functionality of physical stores by allowing customers to return online orders at them; and (iii) fulfillment flexibility expands functionality by allowing customers to pick up products purchased online at physical stores. We show that when the physical stores are given fewer (more) functions, as with the showroom (return or fulfillment flexibility) strategy, the omnichannel retailer may find it optimal to increase (reduce) the number and/or size of the physical stores.

參考文獻：Fei Gao, Vishal V. Agrawal, Shiliang Cui (2022) The Effect of Multichannel and Omnichannel Retailing on Physical Stores. Management Science 68(2):809-826.

2.數字時代的誠實

現代通信技術能夠有效地交換信息，但往往犧牲了更傳統的通信形式所固有的人與人之間的直接互動。這就提出了一個問題，即缺乏人際互動是否會導致個人利用信息不對稱。我們對總共848名受試者進行了兩項實驗，以檢查人機交互如何影響為獲得經濟利益的作弊行為。我們發現，無論機器是否配備人類功能，個人在與機器交互時作弊的次數大約是人際互動時作弊次數的三倍。在與人際互動時，個人特別不願意報告不太可能和可疑的結果，這與社會形象問題是一致的。第二個實驗表明，不誠實的個人在面臨作弊機會時更願意與機器互動。我們的研究結果表明，人類的存在是減輕不誠實行為的關鍵，並且通過自我選擇溝通渠道可用於篩選不誠實的個人。

Modern communication technologies enable efficient exchange of information but often sacrifice direct human interaction inherent inmore traditional forms of communication. This raises the question of whether the lack of personal interaction induces individuals to exploit informational asymmetries. We conducted two experiments with a total of 848 subjects to examine how human versus machine interaction influences cheating for financial gain. We find that individuals cheat about three times more when they interact with a machine rather than a person, regardless of whether the machine is equipped with human features. When interacting with a human, individuals are particularly reluctant to report unlikely and therefore, suspicious outcomes, which is consistent with social image concerns. The second experiment shows that dishonest individuals prefer to interact with a machine when facing an opportunity to cheat. Our results suggest that human presence is key to mitigating dishonest behavior and that self-selection into communication channels can be used to screen for dishonest people.

參考文獻：Alain Cohn, Tobias Gesche, Michel André Maréchal (2022) Honesty in the Digital Age. Management Science 68(2):827-845.

3.通過預測人類判斷力來調整算法規定：倉庫運營中的大規模現場實驗

規定順序包裝指令（在哪個盒子中以哪個順序包裝哪些物品）的傳統優化算法專注於盒子體積利用率，但往往忽略人類行為偏差。我們觀察到阿里巴巴集團倉庫中包裝工人有5.8%的包裹偏離算法規定，這些偏差增加了包裝時間並降低了運營效率。我們假設了兩種機制並證明它們會導致兩種類型的偏差：(1) 信息偏差源於工人擁有更多信息，進而比算法有更好的解決方案；(2) 複雜性偏差是由於工人厭惡、無能或自行決定精確實施算法規定。我們提出了一種新的「以人為中心的裝箱算法」，該算法可以預測並結合人為偏差，以減少偏差並提高性能。它使用機器學習技術預測工人何時更有可能切換到更大的盒子，然後主動調整這些「目標包裹」的算法規定。我們與阿里巴巴集團進行了大規模的隨機現場實驗。訂單被隨機分配到新算法（對照組）或阿里巴巴的原始算法（控制組）。我們的現場實驗結果表明，我們的新算法將目標包裹的大箱子切換率從29.5%降低到23.8%，並將目標包裹的平均打包時間減少了4.5%。這種結合人為偏差來改進優化算法的想法也可以推廣到物流和運營中的其他流程。

Conventional optimization algorithms that prescribe order packing instructions (which items to pack in which sequence in which box) focus on box volume utilization yet tend to overlook human behavioral deviations. We observe that packing workers at the warehouses of the Alibaba Group deviate from algorithmic prescriptions for 5.8% of packages, and these deviations increase packing time and reduce operational efficiency. We posit two mechanisms and demonstrate that they result in two types of deviations: (1) information deviations stem from workers having more information and in turn better solutions than the algorithm; and (2) complexity deviations result from workers』 aversion, inability, or discretion to precisely implement algorithmic prescriptions. We propose a new 「humancentric bin packing algorithm」 that anticipates and incorporates human deviations to reduce deviations and improve performance. It predicts when workers are more likely to switch to larger boxes using machine learning techniques and then proactively adjusts the algorithmic prescriptions of those 「targeted packages.」We conducted a large-scale randomized field experiment with the Alibaba Group. Orders were randomly assigned to either the new algorithm (treatment group) or Alibaba’s original algorithm (control group). Our field experiment results show that our newalgorithm lowers the rate of switching to larger boxes from 29.5% to 23.8% for targeted packages and reduces the average packing time of targeted packages by 4.5%. This idea of incorporating human deviations to improve optimization algorithms could also be generalized to other processes in logistics and operations.

參考文獻：Jiankun Sun, Dennis J. Zhang, Haoyuan Hu, Jan A. Van Mieghem (2022) Predicting Human Discretion to Adjust Algorithmic Prescription: A Large-Scale Field Experiment in Warehouse Operations. Management Science 68(2):846-865.

4.廣告限制如何影響消費者搜索

廣告經常因僅提供有關產品的部分或選擇性信息而受到批評。這種批評在保健產品中尤為明顯，因為消費者和公司之間可能存在大量信息不對稱。本文探討了旨在防止選擇性廣告的政府限制如何影響消費者所接觸的信息類型。我們利用美國食品和藥物管理局 (FDA) 打擊形式的自然實驗，阻止製藥公司在其互聯網搜索廣告中使用選擇性選擇的信息。由於公司無法在允許的廣告空間內充分記錄副作用，他們刪除了廣告。研究結果表明，在廣告被刪除後，消費者更有可能從基於用戶生成內容的網站或專注於不受 FDA 監管的醫療的網站（例如加拿大藥店和推廣草藥的網站）搜索信息。

Advertising is often criticized for presenting only partial or selective information about products. This criticism is particularly pronounced for health products, where large asymmetries in information may exist between consumers and firms. This paper explores how government restrictions designed to prevent selective advertising affect the types of information to which consumers are exposed. We exploit a natural experiment in the form of a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) crackdown that prevented pharmaceutical companies from using selectively chosen information in their Internet search ads. Because companies could not adequately document side effectswithin the advertising space allowed, they removed their ads. Our results suggest that, after the ads were removed, consumers were more likely to seek information from websites based on usergenerated content or websites that focused on medical treatments not regulated by the FDA, such as Canadian pharmacies and sites promoting herbal remedies.

參考文獻：Lesley Chiou, Catherine E. Tucker (2022) How Do Restrictions on Advertising Affect Consumer Search?. Management Science 68(2):866-882.

5.全渠道運營中的需求匯集

傳統零售商和電子零售商都在實施全渠道策略，例如在線購買到店提貨 (BOPS)。我們建立了一個程式化的模型，從庫存的角度研究BOPS計劃對商店運營的影響。我們考慮了兩個消費者群，即僅線下購買的純實體店消費者和戰略性地在線下和線上渠道之間進行選擇的全能消費者。研究結果表明，BOPS 可能使零售商受益或受損，這取決於兩個根本的系統本原：商店訪問成本和在線等待成本。如果在線等待成本相對較低，到店成本更低，BOPS可以誘導全能消費者從在線購買遷移到BOPS，從而導致實體（B&M）商店的需求集中。這種需求集中為零售商提供了兩個好處：降低了庫存積壓成本，並且在重新優化庫存後，可以提高實體商店的滿足率，從而使現有消費者受益，並有可能吸引更多消費者光顧商店。相反，如果到店成本和在線等待成本都較高，後者甚至更高，則引入 BOPS 會導致全能消費者從線下採購向 BOPS 遷移，從而導致需求去集中化。這導致庫存重新優化後的滿足率較低，這可能是 BOPS 下利潤率較低的結果，這會拒絕滿足純實體店消費者的需求並傷害零售商。

Both traditional retailers and e-tailers have been implementing omnichannel strategies such as buy online, pick up at store (BOPS). We build a stylized model to investigate the impact of the BOPS initiative on store operations from an inventory perspective. We consider two segments of customers, namely store-only customers who only make purchases offline and omni-customers who strategically choose between offline and online channels. We show that BOPS may either benefit or hurt the retailer depending on two fundamental system primitives: the store visiting cost and the online waiting cost. If the online waiting cost is relatively low and the store visiting cost is even lower, BOPS can induce omni-customers to migrate from online buying to BOPS, leading to demand pooling at the brick-and-mortar (B&M) store. Such demand pooling provides two benefits for the retailer: it reduces the overstocking cost, and after inventory reoptimization, it results in a higher fill rate at the B&M store, which benefits existing customers and potentially attracts more customers to the store. In contrast, if both store visiting and online waiting costs are relatively high with the latter even higher, introducing BOPS can result in demand depooling as a result of the migration of the omni-customers from offline purchasing to BOPS. This leads to a lower fill rate after inventory reoptimization, likely the result of a lower profit margin under BOPS, which turns away store-only customers and hurts the retailer.

參考文獻：Ming Hu, Xiaolin Xu, Weili Xue, Yi Yang (2022) Demand Pooling in Omnichannel Operations. Management Science 68(2):883-894.

6.市場力量如何影響動態定價：來自汽車經銷商庫存波動的證據

本文實證研究了市場力量在存在庫存的情況下對動態定價的影響。本文研究背景是汽車零售行業；我們分析了汽車經銷商在不同程度的市場力量下如何根據庫存水平調整價格。我們首先確定庫存波動會為供不應求的汽車創造稀缺租金。然後，我們研究表明經銷商根據庫存調整價格的能力取決於他們的市場力量，即他們銷售區域內替代庫存的數量。具體來說，當經銷商發現自己處於高市場勢力而不是低市場勢力的情況下，價格-庫存關係的斜率（更高的庫存會降低價格）明顯更陡峭。在其他條件不變的情況下，具有高市場支配力的經銷商將交易價格降低約0.57%，相當於經銷商平均每輛車利潤率的32.5%，即平均每輛汽車的145.6美元。相反，當競爭更加激烈時，從庫存短缺到中等庫存水平會使交易價格在其他條件不變的情況下降低約0.35%，相當於經銷商平均每輛車利潤率的20.2%或90.9美元。據我們所知，本文是第一個以經驗證明市場力量影響企業動態定價能力的研究。

This paper investigates empirically the effect of market power on dynamic pricing in the presence of inventories. Our setting is the auto retail industry; we analyze how automotive dealerships adjust prices to inventory levels under varying degrees of market power.We first establish that inventory fluctuations create scarcity rents for cars that are in short supply. We then show that dealers』 ability to adjust prices in response to inventory depends on their market power, that is, the quantity of substitute inventory in their selling area. Specifically, we show that the slope of the price–inventory relationship (higher inventory lowers prices) is significantly steeper when dealers find themselves in a situation of high rather than low market power. A dealership with high market power moving from a situation of inventory shortage to a median inventory level lowers transaction prices by about 0.57% ceteris paribus, corresponding to 32.5% of dealers』 average per-vehicle profit margin or $145.6 on the average car. Conversely, when competition is more intense, moving from inventory shortage to amedian inventory level lowers transaction prices by about 0.35% ceteris paribus, corresponding to 20.2% of dealers』 average per-vehicle profit margin or $90.9. To our knowledge, we are the first to empirically show that market power affects firms』 ability to dynamically price.

參考文獻：Ayelet Israeli, Fiona Scott-Morton, Jorge Silva-Risso, Florian Zettelmeyer (2022) How Market Power Affects Dynamic Pricing: Evidence from Inventory Fluctuations at Car Dealerships. Management Science 68(2):895-916.

7.價格談判下基於收入配額的盈利能力

本文研究了當銷售人員協商價格時，基於收入的月度配額如何影響零售商的利潤。使用冰箱的交易水平數據，我們首先提供價格受配額影響的簡化形式的證據：如果銷售人員在當月最後一周接近配額10%，則協商折扣大約高3.8%。在此結果的指導下，我們指定並估計了一個需求模型，該模型通過兩個力量來識別配額的影響：銷售人員為銷售產品而付出的努力和他們的談判地位。結果表明，隨着銷售人員越來越接近他們的配額，他們的努力會增加，無論是哪一周，他們的討價還價地位都會減弱（即他們提供更低的價格），但僅限於當月的最後一周。我們使用這些結果來分析配額的影響，研究發現，在固定銷售人員的總薪酬不變的情況下，取消配額會導致零售商的利潤降低8%。這種減少主要源於努力的減少，這超過了加強銷售人員的談判地位所帶來的任何好處。利潤的變化具有經濟意義，因為取消價格談判（即轉向固定定價）和配額會導致利潤減少高達36%。

We study how the presence of a monthly revenue-based quota impacts a retailer’s profits when prices are negotiated by a salesperson. Using transaction level data for refrigerators, we first provide reduced-form evidence that prices are impacted by the quota: the negotiated discounts are approximately 3.8% higher if the salesperson is 10% closer to reaching the quota in the final week of the month. Guided by this result, we specify and estimate a demand model that identifies the impact of the quota through two forces: the effort salespeople expend in order to sell the product and their bargaining position. Results indicate that, as salespeople get closer to reaching their quota, their effort increases regardless of the week, and their bargaining position weakens (i.e., they offer lower prices), but only in the final week of the month. We use these results to analyze the impact of the quota and find that, holding salespeoples』 total compensation fixed, eliminating quotas results in 8% lower profit for the retailer. This decrease stems primarily from the reduction in effort that outweighs any benefit from strengthening the salespeoples』 bargaining position. The change in profit is economically meaningful because eliminating both price negotiation (i.e., moving to fixed pricing) and the quota results in an up to 36% reduction in profit.

參考文獻：Pranav Jindal, Peter Newberry (2022) The Profitability of Revenue-Based Quotas Under Price Negotiation. Management Science 68(2):917-940.

8.社會互動對雙頭壟斷競爭的影響與質量考慮

本文研究了社會互動對競爭公司的質量差異、定價決策和利潤表現的影響。我們識別和分析了兩種形式的社會互動：（1）市場擴張效應（MEE）——整個市場因兩家公司的銷售而擴張——和（2）價值提升效應（VEE）——消費者獲得額外的收益根據該公司以前和/或當前的銷售量從該公司購買的效用。我們考慮一個兩階段的雙頭壟斷競爭框架，其中兩家公司在第一階段同時選擇質量水平，在第二階段進行兩階段的價格競爭。在主模型中，我們假設每家公司設定一個價格並在兩個銷售期間承諾該價格。我們發現，兩種形式的社會互動都傾向於降低價格，並在給定的質量水平上加劇價格競爭。然而，MEE 削弱了產品質量差異化，對高質量和低質量公司都是良性的。它還使消費者受益，提高了社會福利。相比之下，VEE擴大了質量差異化，只對優質企業有利，對劣質企業尤其不利。它進一步減少了消費者剩餘。無論 VEE 交互是否涉及以前或當前的消費者，這種影響都是一致的。我們進一步討論了幾個模型擴展，包括動態定價、綜合社會效應和各種成本結構，並驗證上述 MEE 和 VEE 的影響對這些擴展在質量上是穩健的。我們的結果為競爭市場中的公司提供了重要的管理啟示，並表明他們不僅需要了解消費者的社交互動，更重要的是，區分互動的主要形式，以便應用適當的營銷策略。

We study the impacts of social interactions on competing firms』 quality differentiation, pricing decisions, and profit performance. Two forms of social interactions are identified and analyzed: (1) market-expansion effect (MEE)—the total market expands as a result of both firms』 sales—and (2) value-enhancement effect (VEE)—a consumer gains additional utility of purchasing from one firm based on this firm’s previous and/or current sales volume. We consider a two-stage duopoly competition framework, in which both firms select quality levels in the first stage simultaneously and engage in a two-period price competition in the second stage. In the main model, we assume that each firm sets a single price and commits to it across two selling periods. We find that both forms of social interactions tend to lower prices and intensify price competition for given quality levels. However, MEE weakens the product-quality differentiation and is benign to both highquality and low-quality firms. It also benefits consumers and improves social welfare. By contrast, VEE enlarges the quality differentiation and only benefits the high-quality firm, but is particularly malignant to the low-quality firm. It further reduces the consumers』 monetary surplus. Such impact is consistent, regardless of whether the VEE interactions involve previous or current consumers. We further discuss several model extensions, including dynamic pricing, combined social effects, and various cost structures, and verify that the aforementioned impacts of MEE and VEE are qualitatively robust to those extensions. Our results provide important managerial insights for firms in competitive markets and suggest that they need to not only be aware of the consumers』 social interactions, but also, more importantly, distinguish the predominant form of the interactions so as to apply proper marketing strategies.

參考文獻：Xin Geng, Xiaomeng Guo, Guang Xiao (2022) Impact of Social Interactions on Duopoly Competition with Quality Considerations. Management Science 68(2):941-959.

9.使用市場價從客戶數據聚合中進行個性化

當消費者對其預訂價值的推斷受到環境噪聲的影響時，公司可以使用客戶數據聚合來獲得優質知識。這有利於個性化定價，但也可能引起消費者多付的懷疑。為了減輕懷疑並讓消費者相信它們的價值，公司可以設計其個性化方案，在個性化價格之外還包括市場價。我們發現，只有帶有定價的分離均衡才能符合直觀標準。具體而言，當消費者低估其價值時，必須使用具有約束力的市場價來告知消費者市場的價格上限。與傳統觀念相反，公司不能濫用其信息優勢來引導消費者高估，而價格歧視可能會嚴格使避免多付錢的消費者受益。

When consumers』 inferences of their reservation values are subject to environmental noise, firms can use customer data aggregation to obtain superior knowledge. This facilitates personalized pricing but may also induce consumer suspicions of overpaying. To alleviate the suspicions and convince consumers of their value, the firm may design its personalization scheme to include a list price in addition to the personalized prices. We find that only a separating equilibrium with list pricing survives the intuitive criterion. Specifically, when consumers underestimate their value, it is essential to use a binding list price to inform the consumers about the market’s price ceiling. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the firm cannot abuse its informational advantage to steer consumers into overestimation, and price discriminationmay strictly benefit the consumers who avoid overpaying.

參考文獻：Zibin Xu, Anthony Dukes (2022) Personalization from Customer Data Aggregation Using List Price. Management Science 68(2):960-980.

10.信息摩擦市場中的產品線和價格歧視

經濟學中的一個眾所周知的原則是，公司通過區分他們的產品來降低市場競爭。但是，在本文中，我們表明信息摩擦會使這一原則失效。我們建立了具有信息摩擦的二級價格歧視的雙寡頭競爭模型，其中（i）產品質量重疊的均衡總是存在的，而（ii）只有當信息摩擦和提供高質量的成本都足夠小時，產品質量不重疊的均衡才存在。因此，除了試圖緩和競爭之外，其他原因應該可以解釋為什麼公司在某些情況下擁有不重疊的產品線。

A well-known principle in economics is that firms differentiate their product offerings in order to relax competition. However, in this paper we show that information frictions can invalidate this principle. We build a duopolistic competition model of seconddegree price discrimination with information frictions in which (i) an equilibrium always exists with overlapping product qualities, whereas (ii) an equilibrium with nonoverlapping product qualities exists only if both information frictions and the cost of providing high quality are sufficiently small. As a consequence, reasons other than an attempt to soften competition should explain why firms in some cases carry nonoverlapping product lines.

參考文獻：Natalia Fabra, Juan-Pablo Montero (2022) Product Lines and Price Discrimination in Markets with Information Frictions. Management Science 68(2):981-1001.

11.跟隨客戶：動態競爭重新定位

當競爭公司試圖跟隨消費者偏好演變時，我們考慮動態重新定位，同時考慮到競爭互動，包括靜態市場競爭和不同公司定位的動態影響。我們充分描述了動態市場均衡，其中包括公司根據消費者偏好重新定位的時間。隨着消費者偏好逐漸遠離兩家公司所在的位置，一家公司首先會跟隨消費者偏好，而第二家公司只有在消費者偏好繼續遠離該公司的情況下才會移動。該模型預測了豐富的市場動態，如果消費者偏好處於相對中間位置，公司會在一段時間內保持不同的定位，或者公司會重新定位以遵循消費者偏好，但如果消費者偏好恢復，則會重新定位回原來的位置。我們發現，當消費者偏好或貼現率的可變性較大或重新定位屬性的重要性較小時，企業不太可能遵循消費者偏好。當消費者偏好的可變性、貼現率或重新定位屬性的重要性增加時，公司的反應更加異質，這也會導致更長的差異化期。我們還發現，競爭公司重新定位的頻率低於社會最優和共謀框架下的，並且我們發現在共謀下比在競爭下有更多的差異化。

We consider dynamic repositioning when competing firms try to follow the evolution of consumer preferences while taking into account the competitive interaction, both in terms of static market competition and the dynamic effects of different firm positionings. We fully characterize the dynamic market equilibrium, which includes the timing of the firms』 repositionings depending on consumer preferences. As consumer preferences evolve away from where both firms are located, one firm first moves to follow consumer preferences, with the second firm only moving if the consumer preferences continue evolving away from that firm. The model predicts rich market dynamics, where firms stay for some period in different positionings if consumer preferences are in a relatively middle ground or where a firm repositions to follow consumer preferences but then repositions back to the original position if consumer preferences return. We find that, when the variability of the consumer preferences or the discount rate is greater or when the importance of the repositioning attribute is smaller, firms are less likely to follow consumer preferences. Firms are more heterogeneous in their responses, which leads to longer periods of differentiation when the variability of the consumer preferences, the discount rate, or the importance of the repositioning attribute increases. We also find that competing firms reposition less frequently than what is socially optimal and what collusion would imply, and we find more differentiation under collusion than under competition.

參考文獻：Z. Eddie Ning, J. Miguel Villas-Boas (2022) Following the Customers: Dynamic Competitive Repositioning. Management Science 68(2):1002-1018.

12.合約市場的疏忽：來自電信期權整合的證據

我們利用有關移動訂閱市場未來價格變化的通知來研究客戶的注意力不集中。通過來自大型電信運營商的詳細客戶級別數據，以及競爭對手提供的價格和合同數據，我們發現，這種通知會導致客戶增加注意力，進而導致觸發消費者搜索、計劃切換和流失。特別的是，研究表明，對於成本會隨着新價格降低的客戶，月流失傾向增加了60%（從 1% 到 1.6%）。我們還發現，在通知後而不是在未來價格變化時，客戶流失率直接增加，我們認為這種時間模式是複雜的疏忽的證據：客戶立即採取行動以減輕他們自己未來慣性的影響。我們通過一個問卷調查補充了我們的研究，並且發現了證明注意力不集中在確定消費者如何適應市場變化方面的重要作用的直接證據。

We study customer inattention by utilizing a notification about a future price change in the mobile subscription market.With detailed customer-level data from a large telecomoperator, togetherwith data on prices and contracts offered by competitors, we document that the notification causes an increase in customer attention, which triggers search, plan switching, and churn. In particular, we show that the monthly propensity to churn increases by 60% (from1% to 1.6%) among customers whose costs would decrease with the new prices. We also document an increase in churn directly after the notification, not at the time of the future price change, and argue that this timing pattern is evidence of sophisticated inattention: customers take immediate action tomitigate the impact of their own future inertia.We supplement the analysis with a survey and find supporting evidence for the important role of inattention in determining how consumers adapt to changes in the market.

參考文獻：Bjørn-Atle Reme, Helene Lie Røhr, Morten Sæthre (2022) Inattention in Contract Markets: Evidence from a Consolidation of Options in Telecom. Management Science 68(2):1019-1038.

13.非平穩需求時間序列下的雙重採購和平滑：使用 SpeedFactories 進行回流

我們研究了將全球生產的一小部分近岸生產到僅服務於可變需求的本地 SpeedFactories。響應速度快的 SpeedFactory 交貨時間短，降低了提前大量生產的風險，但並不涉及完全的需求回流。使用盈虧平衡分析，我們分析了與完全離岸外包相比，使用 SpeedFactory 進行雙重採購的交貨時間、需求和成本特徵。我們的分析將著名的按庫存策略線性推廣到存在容量成本的環境中。該策略允許訂單平滑以降低容量成本，並且相對於（未知）最優策略表現良好。我們強調了自相關和非平穩需求序列對回流的經濟效益的重大影響，這些序列在實踐中很普遍，但難以分析。在方法論上，我們採用線性策略和正態分布的需求，並使用 Z 變換來呈現精確的分析。

We investigate near-shoring a small part of the global production to local SpeedFactories that serve only the variable demand. The short lead time of the responsive SpeedFactory reduces the risk of making large volumes in advance, yet it does not involve a complete reshoring of demand. Using a break-even analysis, we investigate the lead time, demand, and cost characteristics that make dual sourcing with a SpeedFactory desirable compared with complete off-shoring. Our analysis uses a linear generalization of the celebrated order-up-to inventory policy to settings where capacity costs exist. The policy allows for order smoothing to reduce capacity costs and performs well relative to the (unknown) optimal policy. We highlight the significant impact of auto-correlated and nonstationary demand series, which are prevalent in practice yet challenging to analyze, on the economic benefit of reshoring. Methodologically, we adopt a linear policy and normally distributed demand and use Z–transforms to present exact analyses.

參考文獻：Robert N. Boute, Stephen M. Disney, Joren Gijsbrechts, Jan A. Van Mieghem (2022) Dual Sourcing and Smoothing Under Nonstationary Demand Time Series: Reshoring with SpeedFactories. Management Science 68(2):1039-1057.

14.供應鏈網絡中的社會責任審計

我們研究買方在現有網絡中審核供應商的問題，以確保符合社會責任。如果供應商的違規行為被曝光（無論是媒體、監管機構還是非政府組織），買方將遭受經濟損失。為避免損害，買方可能會審核網絡以識別違規行為。如果供應商未能通過審核，買方必須採取兩種代價高昂的行動：糾正供應商或放棄供應商（連同任何關聯供應商）。放棄供應商會改變網絡拓撲結構，減少競爭，從而增加買方因均衡而產生的投入成本。我們表明，買方的最優動態審計政策有兩個子階段：買方將首先審計並放棄一些供應商，然後審計並糾正所有剩餘的供應商或完全停止審計。通過停止，買方可以容忍網絡中的一些不合規行為（「見不到惡，聽不到惡」）。在審計和放棄子階段中，當僅在上層進行審計時，買方總是審計價值最低的未經審計的供應商，從而在網絡中產生更大的平衡。當買方審核雙層供應商時，它可能會選擇價值最低的供應商。買方可以選擇處於關鍵位置的供應商來幫助確定網絡的一部分的可行性（「試金石」）。延伸來看，當一級供應商的違規行為對買方造成更高的處罰時，買方只能對一級供應商進行審核和整改；當審計可能不準確時，買方更有可能容忍更大程度的不合規。

We study a buyer’s problem of auditing suppliers within an existing network to ensure social responsibility compliance. The buyer suffers economic damages if a violation at a supplier is exposed (whether by the media, regulator, or nongovernmental organization). To avoid damages, the buyer may audit the network to identify noncompliance. If a supplier fails an audit, the buyer must take one of two costly actions: either rectify the supplier or drop the supplier (along with any dependent suppliers). Dropping a supplier changes the network topology, reducing competition and thereby increasing the buyer’s input cost arising from an equilibrium. We show that the buyer’s optimal dynamic auditing policy has two subphases: the buyer will first audit and drop some suppliers before either auditing and rectifying all remaining suppliers or halting auditing altogether. By halting, the buyer tolerates some noncompliance in the network (「see no evil, hear no evil」). Within the audit-and-drop subphase, when auditing only in the upper tier, the buyer always audits a least valuable unaudited supplier, yielding greater balance in the network. When the buyer audits both tiers, it might choose a supplier other than the least valuable. The buyer may choose a supplier in a pivotal position to help ascertain the viability of a portion of the network (「litmus test」). In extensions, we find that when violations in tier 1 carry a higher penalty for the buyer, the buyer may audit and rectify only tier 1 suppliers; when audits may be inaccurate, the buyer more likely tolerates a greater level of noncompliance.

參考文獻：Han Zhang, Goker Aydin, Rodney P. Parker (2022) Social Responsibility Auditing in Supply Chain Networks. Management Science 68(2):1058-1077.

15.通過公開披露規範醫學利益衝突：來自醫生支付陽光法的證據

醫院和醫療保健管理人員將高昂的處方藥成本列為他們最大的問題之一。大量研究表明，從製藥公司到醫生的膳食和酬金會導致對昂貴的名牌藥物開出更高的處方，儘管療效差異不大。一些管理人員和學者主張強制披露這些付款以減少這種利益衝突，但許多從業者認為信息披露對處方影響不大，經驗證據參差不齊。本文使用馬薩諸塞州2009年支付披露政策的准實驗來估計公開披露對處方的因果影響。綜合數據集包括五個州的5,730名醫生在48個月內編寫的9個藥物類別中262種藥物的所有零售處方。我們發現，與其他州的對照醫生相比，馬薩諸塞州醫生的品牌藥物處方在披露後顯著減少。這些影響是由政策前時期大量品牌藥處方者推動的，特別是對於政策前銷售隊伍龐大的藥物。在第一個數據發布之前也檢測到了影響，這意味着影響不是因為患者或管理人員對披露的付款做出了回應。相反，一些醫生可能已經改變了他們的付款和處方行為，以避免出現偏見。與許多表明製藥業支付影響處方的研究相結合，本研究表明，強制性公開披露在減少藥品利益衝突和昂貴的品牌藥處方方面發揮着重要作用。

Hospital and healthcare administrators name high prescription drug costs as one of their largest problems. A significant body of research demonstrates that meals and honoraria from pharmaceutical firms to physicians leads to higher prescribing of expensive, brand name drugs, despite little difference in efficacy. Some administrators and scholars have advocated for mandatory disclosure of these payments in order to reduce this conflict of interest, but many practitioners believe disclosure has little effect on prescribing, and the empirical evidence is mixed. This paper uses a quasi-experiment of a 2009 payment disclosure policy in Massachusetts to estimate the causal impact of public disclosure on prescribing. The comprehensive data set includes all retail prescriptions for 262 drugs in nine drug classes written by 5,730 physicians in five states over 48 months. We show a significant postdisclosure reduction in brand name drug prescriptions by Massachusetts physicians, relative to control physicians in other states. These effects are driven by heavy prescribers of brand name drugs in the prepolicy period, particularly for drugs with large prepolicy sales forces. Effects are also detected before the first data were released, implying that the effects are not because patients or administrators responded to the disclosed payments. Instead, some physicians may have changed their payments and prescriptions behavior to avoid appearing biased. Taken in tandem with the many studies showing that pharmaceutical industry payments influence prescribing, this study suggests a strong role for mandatory public disclosure in reducing conflicts of interest in medicine and costly prescribing of brand name drugs.

參考文獻：Matthew Chao, Ian Larkin (2022) Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Medicine Through Public Disclosure: Evidence from a Physician Payments Sunshine Law. Management Science 68(2):1078-1094.

16.捆綁大小定價問題的凸優化

我們研究捆綁大小定價 (BSP) 問題，其中壟斷者向客戶銷售捆綁產品，每個捆綁的價格僅取決於捆綁的大小（商品數量）。儘管這種定價機制在實踐中很有吸引力，但很難找到最優的捆綁價格，因為它涉及到特徵化訂單統計數據的最大部分和的分布。在本文中，我們建議僅使用消費者估值的第一和第二矩來解決離散選擇模型下的 BSP 問題。捆綁值之間的相關性由協方差矩陣表示。研究表明，該模型下的 BSP 問題是凸的，並且可以使用現成的求解器有效地解決。我們的方法可以靈活地優化任何給定捆綁大小的價格。數值結果表明，與最先進的啟發式算法相比，它的性能非常好。這為解決各種分布和維度下的 BSP 問題提供了一種統一而有效的方法。

We study the bundle size pricing (BSP) problem in which a monopolist sells bundles of products to customers and the price of each bundle depends only on the size (number of items) of the bundle. Although this pricing mechanism is attractive in practice, finding optimal bundle prices is difficult because it involves characterizing distributions of the maximum partial sums of order statistics. In this paper, we propose to solve the BSP problem under a discrete choice model using only the first and second moments of customer valuations. Correlations between valuations of bundles are captured by the covariance matrix.We show that the BSP problem under this model is convex and can be efficiently solved using off-the-shelf solvers. Our approach is flexible in optimizing prices for any given bundle size. Numerical results show that it performs very well compared with state-of-the-art heuristics. This provides a unified and efficient approach to solve the BSP problem under various distributions and dimensions.

參考文獻：Xiaobo Li, Hailong Sun, Chung Piaw Teo (2022) Convex Optimization for Bundle Size Pricing Problem. Management Science 68(2):1095-1106.

17.市場參與者能否（足夠）準確地報告他們的偏好

在機制設計理論中，通常假設代理人可以完美地報告他們的偏好，即使在這種假設使現實緊張的複雜環境中也是如此。我們通過實驗測試真實的市場參與者是否可以「足夠準確地」報告他們對課程安排的真實偏好，以實現一種新的課程分配機制，即來自同等收入的近似競爭均衡（A-CEEI），以實現其理論收益。為了使用市場參與者的真實偏好（即，不是市場設計實驗中典型的人為「誘導偏好」），我們開發了一種新的實驗方法。我們的提出的「引發偏好」方法，通過一系列二元選擇從受試者中生成偏好數據。這些二元選擇表明，受試者更喜歡他們在 A-CEEI 下構建的時間表，而不是他們在現有投標點拍賣機制下構建的時間表，並且 A-CEEI 減少了嫉妒，表明受試者能夠準確地報告他們的偏好以實現效率和 A-CEEI 的公平利益。然而，偏好報告錯誤確實會嚴重損害機制性能。與序數偏好信息相比，一個可識別的錯誤模式是受試者報告基數偏好信息的難度相對更大。該實驗有助於說服沃頓商學院採用新機制，並幫助指導其實際實施的各個方面，尤其是在偏好報告方面。

In mechanism design theory it is common to assume that agents can perfectly report their preferences, even in complex settings in which this assumption strains reality. We experimentally test whether real market participants can report their real preferences for course schedules 「accurately enough」 for a novel course allocation mechanism, approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (A-CEEI), to realize its theoretical benefits. To use market participants』 real preferences (i.e., rather than artificial 「induced preferences」 as is typical in market design experiments), we develop a new experimental method. Our method, the 「elicited preferences」 approach, generates preference data from subjects through a series of binary choices. These binary choices reveal that subjects prefer their schedules constructed under A-CEEI to their schedules constructed under the incumbent mechanism, a bidding points auction, and that A-CEEI reduces envy, suggesting subjects are able to report their preferences accurately enough to realize the efficiency and fairness benefits of A-CEEI. However, preference-reporting mistakes do meaningfully harm mechanism performance.One identifiable pattern of mistakes was that subjects had relativelymore difficulty reporting cardinal as opposed to ordinal preference information. The experiment helped to persuade the Wharton School to adopt the new mechanism and helped guide aspects of its practical implementation, especially around preference reporting.

參考文獻：Eric Budish, Judd B. Kessler (2022) Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?. Management Science 68(2):1107-1130.

18.短期同伴群體對績效的持續影響：來自高等教育自然實驗的證據

本文研究了短期同伴接觸對大學環境中長期表現的持續影響。本研究利用在強制性迎新周期間將本科生隨機分配到同齡人小組，並跟蹤學生在四年內（直到畢業）的表現。對具有高水平同伴能力的定向周小組的分配與大學第一年的較低表現和較高的早期輟學概率有關。這些不利影響完全是由低能力學生與高能力同齡人接觸造成的。在第一年之後，在迎新周期間接觸更高的同伴能力會對選擇大學最受歡迎的專業（工商管理）和最終平均成績產生負面影響。綜上所述，研究結果表明，短期同伴群體的構成對個人選擇和長期績效結果很重要。

This paper studies the persistent effects of short-term peer exposure on long-run performance in a college setting. I exploit the random assignment of undergraduates to peer groups during a mandatory orientation week and track the students』 performance over four years (until graduation). Assignment to orientation week groups with high levels of peer ability is associated with lower performance during the first year at college and a higher probability of early dropout. These adverse effects are driven entirely by the exposure of low-ability students to high-ability peers. Beyond the first year, exposure to higher peer ability during the orientation week negatively affects selection into the college’s most popular major (business administration) and final grade point average. Taken together, the findings suggest that the composition of short-term peer groups matters for individual choices and long-run performance outcomes.

參考文獻：Petra Thiemann (2022) The Persistent Effects of Short-Term Peer Groups on Performance: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Higher Education. Management Science 68(2):1131-1148.

19.時間偏好和風險偏好措施在調查中的表現

時間偏好和風險偏好在廣泛的行為中發揮着重要作用，包括財務決策、企業家精神和對代理人的適當激勵。許多方法已經被開發並用於假設性測量在調查中的這些偏好，但它們產生了不一致的結果。我們分析了一個面板數據集，其中受試者共同回答了400多項調查問卷，包括15次時間偏好和36次風險偏好的抽取。我們使用以下標準評估這些措施的績效：（1）預測經濟上重要行為的能力和（2）與其他可觀察的區別。我們發現測量的預測性存在很大的異質性。時間偏好的最佳測量方法是滴定法，其中一系列自適應二元選擇問題縮小了受試者的無差異點，而對於風險偏好，它是風險厭惡的自我報告測量。使用因子分析，我們發現時間偏好可以由單個因素很好地解釋，但風險偏好會受到多個因素的影響。然而，第一個因素幾乎完全依賴於自我報告的風險偏好措施，這個因素解釋了大部分變化。這些證據可以幫助研究人員了解在他們的調查問卷中應包括哪些抽取方法。

Time preferences and risk preferences play an important role in a wide range of behavior, including financial decisions, entrepreneurship, and the proper incentivizing of agents. Numerous methods have been developed to measure these preferences hypothetically in surveys, but they have yielded inconsistent results. We analyze a panel data set in which subjects have collectively answered more than 400 surveys including 15 time preference and 36 risk-preference elicitations. We evaluate the performance of these measures using the criteria of (1) ability to predict economically important behavior and (2) distinctness from other observables. We find substantial heterogeneity in the predictiveness of the measures. The best performing measure for time-preference is a titration method, in which a sequence of adaptive binary-choice questions narrows in on a subject’s indifference point, and for risk-preference it is a self-report measure of risk aversion. Using factor analysis, we find that time preferences are well explained by a single factor, but risk preferences load on multiple factors. However, the first factor loads almost entirely on self-reported risk-preference measures, and this factor explains much of the variation. The evidence can help inform researchers about which elicitation methods to include in their surveys.

參考文獻：Joshua Tasoff, Wenjie Zhang (2022) The Performance of Time-Preference and Risk-Preference Measures in Surveys. Management Science 68(2):1149-1173.

20.關於隨機對象的公平劃分

相比蘋果，安更喜歡橘子；相比橘子，鮑勃更喜歡蘋果。明天他們會以相同的概率收到橘子或蘋果中的其中一種。每次給每個代理人一半的機會分配水果是公平的。然而，一致的是，無論出現什麼水果都會分配給更喜歡它的代理人，這會給每個代理人一個更高的預期效用，並且在平均意義上是公平的：在預期中，每個代理人更喜歡這種分配水果方式而不是平均分配水果方式；也就是說，代理人獲得了公平的份額。我們把這個熟悉的觀察轉變成一個經濟設計問題：在繪製一個隨機對象（水果）時，我們了解每個代理人的實際效用，並將其與代理人效用分布的平均值進行比較；沒有其他關於分布的統計信息可用。我們僅使用這些稀疏信息以最有效的方式充分描述分配規則，同時為每個人提供公平的份額。儘管單個效用的概率分布是任意的，並且大部分是經理不知道的，但當經理完全訪問此分布時，這些規則的執行範圍與最佳規則相同。

Ann likes oranges much more than apples; Bob likes apples much more than oranges. Tomorrow they will receive one fruit that will be an orange or an apple with equal probability. Giving one half to each agent is fair for each realization of the fruit. However, agreeing that whatever fruit appears will go to the agent who likes it more gives a higher expected utility to each agent and is fair in the average sense: in expectation, each agent prefers the allocation to the equal division of the fruit; that is, the agent gets a fair share. We turn this familiar observation into an economic design problem: upon drawing a random object (the fruit), we learn the realized utility of each agent and can compare it to the mean of the agent’s distribution of utilities; no other statistical information about the distribution is available. We fully characterize the division rules using only this sparse information in the most efficient possible way while giving everyone a fair share. Although the probability distribution of individual utilities is arbitrary and mostly unknown to the manager, these rules perform in the same range as the best rule when the manager has full access to this distribution.

參考文獻：Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin, Fedor Sandomirskiy (2022) On the Fair Division of a Random Object. Management Science 68(2):1174-1194.

21.模型不確定性下的決策：Fréchet–Wasserstein 平均偏好

本文通過研究一類變分偏好，為多概率模型下的決策文獻做出了貢獻。這些偏好是根據 Fr.echet 平均效用泛函定義的，它基於概率模型空間中的 Wasserstein 度量。為了產生一個與給定集合中所有概率模型「最接近」的度量，我們找到集合的重心。我們推導出 Fr.echet-Wasserstein 均值效用泛函的顯式表達式，並表明它們可以用在風險厭惡和歧義厭惡之間提供易於處理的聯繫的擴展來表達。以下通過兩個應用來舉例說明本研究提出的效用泛函。第一個應用程序允許我們在模型不確定性下定義社會貼現率。在第二個應用中，泛函用於風險證券化。在這種情況下，重心可以解釋為最大化不同決策者達成一致的概率模型，這對於設計和定價巨災債券很有用。

This paper contributes to the literature on decision making under multiple probability models by studying a class of variational preferences. These preferences are defined in terms of Fr.echet mean utility functionals, which are based on the Wasserstein metric in the space of probability models. In order to produce ameasure that is the 「closest」 to all probabilitymodels in the given set,we find the barycenter of the set. We derive explicit expressions for the Fr.echet–Wasserstein mean utility functionals and show that they can be expressed in terms of an expansion that provides a tractable link between risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. The proposed utility functionals are illustrated in terms of two applications. The first application allows us to define the social discount rate under model uncertainty. In the second application, the functionals are used in risk securitization. The barycenter in this case can be interpreted as the model that maximizes the probability that different decisionmakers will agree on,which could be useful for designing and pricing a catastrophe bond.

參考文獻：Electra V. Petracou, Anastasios Xepapadeas, Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos (2022) Decision Making Under Model Uncertainty: Fréchet–Wasserstein Mean Preferences. Management Science 68(2):1195-1211.

22.具有信息獲取和加法學習兩個階段的搜索模型

本文提出了一個具有兩個信息獲取階段的選擇模型。在這個模型中，選擇問題可以解釋為更一般的多臂老虎機問題的變體。我們假設信息獲取採用簡單的「加法形式」——備選方案的價值是兩個組成部分的總和，決策者可以通過兩個階段的信息獲取來學習。這個假設產生了一個易於進行結構估計的模型。該模型的一種可能應用是電子商務網站上的在線購買。對於電子商務網站上的消費者而言，信息獲取可能有兩個階段：消費者可以通過 (i) 瀏覽搜索結果頁面和 (ii) 點擊備選方案來獲取有關備選方案的信息。相比之下，在許多關於在線購買結構經濟計量模型的文獻中，通常只有一個信息獲取階段。因此，我們的研究可能會為建模搜索提供更現實的理論，至少對於那些涉及兩個信息獲取階段的搜索類型（例如在線購買）而言。

This paper presents a model of choice with two stages of information acquisition. In this model, the choice problem can be interpreted as a variant of a more general multiarmed bandit problem. We assume that information acquisition takes a simple 「additive form」—the value of an alternative is the sumof two components, which the decision maker can learn by undertaking two stages of information acquisition. This assumption yields a model that is tractable for the purposes of structural estimation. One possible application of the model is to online purchasing on e-commerce sites. For a consumer on an e-commerce website, there are potentially two stages of information acquisition: the consumer can obtain information about an alternative from (i) browsing the search results page and (ii) clicking on the alternative. By way of contrast, in much of the literature on structural econometric models of online purchasing, there is typically only one stage of information acquisition. Our papermay, therefore, provide amore realistic theory for modeling search, at least for those types of search—such as online purchasing—that involve two stages of information acquisition.

參考文獻：Peter Gibbard (2022) A Model of Search with Two Stages of Information Acquisition and Additive Learning. Management Science 68(2):1212-1217.

23.標註按需車輛共享系統

我們考慮車輛共享系統中最優車隊規模的問題。車輛可用於短期租賃，並可從多個地點訪問。在一個地點租用的車輛可以返回到任何其他地點。車隊的規模不僅要考慮標稱負載以及需求和租賃時間的隨機性，還要考慮由於車輛漫遊導致在每個位置可用的車輛數量的隨機性（車輛不返回原來它們被提取使用的同一位置）。我們使用封閉排隊網絡對動態系統的進行建模，並獲得最佳車輛數量（滿足目標服務水平所需的最小車輛數量）的明確閉型的上下界。具體來說，研究表明，從任何一對上下界開始，我們總是可以獲得另一對上下界，其上下界之間的間隙與需求無關，並且僅取決於規定的函數限制服務級別。我們證明了生成的邊界在幾種情況下是漸近精確的。我們使用邊界的特徵來構造一個簡單且封閉的近似形式，我們證明它始終在生成的下限和上限內，並且在所考慮的漸近狀態下是精確的。大量的數值實驗表明，對於大範圍的參數值，近似值和精確值幾乎無法區分。該近似值是高度可解釋的，緩衝容量用三個明確的術語表示，可以解釋如下：（1）標準緩衝容量，防止需求和租賃時間的隨機性，（2）緩衝容量，防止車輛漫遊, 和 (3) 修正項。我們的分析揭示了標準排隊系統（在服務完成時服務器總是返回到同一個隊列）的最佳大小與服務器在服務完成後隨機加入系統中任何一個隊列的系統之間的重要差異。結果表明，即使在需求微乎其微的系統中，緩衝車輛漫遊所需的額外容量也可能很大。

We consider the problem of optimal fleet sizing in a vehicle sharing system. Vehicles are available for short-term rental and are accessible from multiple locations. A vehicle rented at one location can be returned to any other location. The size of the fleet must account not only for the nominal load and for the randomness in demand and rental duration but also for the randomness in the number of vehicles that are available at each location because of vehicle roaming (vehicles not returning to the same location from which they were picked up). We model the dynamics of the system using a closed queueing network and obtain explicit and closed form lower and upper bounds on the optimal number of vehicles (the minimum number of vehicles needed to meet a target service level). Specifically, we show that starting with any pair of lower and upper bounds, we can always obtain another pair of lower and upper bounds with gaps between the lower and upper bounds that are independent of demand and bounded by a function that depends only on the prescribed service level. We show that the generated bounds are asymptotically exact under several regimes. We use features of the bounds to construct a simple and closed form approximation that we show to be always within the generated lower and upper bounds and is exact under the asymptotic regimes considered. Extensive numerical experiments show that the approximate and exact values are nearly indistinguishable for a wide range of parameter values. The approximation is highly interpretable with buffer capacity expressed in terms of three explicit terms that can be interpreted as follows: (1) standard buffer capacity that is protection against randomness in demand and rental times, (2) buffer capacity that is protection against vehicle roaming, and (3) a correction term. Our analysis reveals important differences between the optimal sizing of standard queueing systems (where servers always return to the same queue upon service completion) and that of systems where servers, upon service completion, randomly join any one of the queues in the system. We show that the additional capacity needed to buffer against vehicle roaming can be substantial even in systems with vanishingly small demand.

參考文獻：Saif Benjaafar, Shining Wu, Hanlin Liu, Einar Bjarki Gunnarsson (2022) Dimensioning On-Demand Vehicle Sharing Systems. Management Science 68(2):1218-1232.

24.在具有非線性等待成本的服務系統中分配優先級（或不分配優先級）

對於具有不同服務時間分布和等待成本的多種客戶類型的排隊系統，眾所周知，如果等待成本隨時間線性發生，則cμ規則是最優的。在本文中，我們尋求在一組固定優先級策略中確定最小化長期平均成本的策略，這些策略僅使用獨立於系統狀態的客戶類型身份。對於具有泊松到達和兩種或更多客戶類型的單服務器排隊系統，我們首先表明某種形式的cμ規則適用，但需要注意的是指數是複雜的，取決於到達率、更高的服務時間、和客戶類型的比例。在二次成本函數下，我們提供了一組條件來確定是優先考慮一種類型，還是不給予優先權，而是按照先到先服務 (FCFS) 的方式提供服務。這些條件有助於深入了解何時應優先考慮嚴格（和固定）優先級策略而不是先到先服務，以及何時應避免使用。例如，我們發現，當流量很大時，服務時間變化很大，並且客戶類型不是異質的，因此將一種類型優先於另一種類型（尤其是比例占主導地位的類型）會比不分配任何優先級更糟糕。通過數值研究，我們對更具體的條件產生了進一步的見解，在這些條件下，可以將固定優先級策略視為先到先服務的替代方案。

For a queueing system with multiple customer types differing in service-time distributions and waiting costs, it is well known that the cμ-rule is optimal if costs for waiting are incurred linearly with time. In this paper, we seek to identify policies that minimize the long-run average cost under nonlinear waiting cost functions within the set of fixed priority policies that only use the type identities of customers independently of the system state. For a single-server queueing system with Poisson arrivals and two or more customer types, we first show that some form of the cμ-rule holds with the caveat that the indices are complex, depending on the arrival rate, higher moments of service time, and proportions of customer types. Under quadratic cost functions, we provide a set of conditions that determine whether to give priority to one type over the other or not to give priority but serve them according to first-come, first-served (FCFS). These conditions lead to useful insights into when strict (and fixed) priority policies should be preferred over FCFS and when they should be avoided. For example, we find that, when traffic is heavy, service times are highly variable, and the customer types are not heterogenous, so then prioritizing one type over the other (especially a proportionally dominant type) would be worse than not assigning any priority. By means of a numerical study, we generate further insights into more specific conditions under which fixed priority policies can be considered as an alternative to FCFS.

參考文獻：Huiyin Ouyang, Nilay Taník Argon, Serhan Ziya (2022) Assigning Priorities (or Not) in Service Systems with Nonlinear Waiting Costs. Management Science 68(2):1233-1255.

25.壓力下的關係：2008 年金融危機後美國航空業的關係外包

本文研究了公司如何在面對其關係價值的永久性衝擊時重組其關係合同。在美國航空業的背景下，我們認為主要航空公司與其外包的區域合作夥伴簽訂了自我執行協議，因為航空公司運營的一個關鍵方面——在惡劣天氣下交換着陸時刻——在形式上是不可收縮的。我們憑經驗表明，主要和區域航空公司在2008 年危機後並未終止其關係合同，而是以恢復其信譽的方式重組了此類合同的範圍。特別的是，我們表明，一家主要航空公司在2008年危機後繼續將航線外包給區域合作夥伴的可能性越小，其先前存在的關係的當前貼現價值越低，因此危機對關係合同「自我執行範圍」的負面影響就越大。

This paper studies how firms restructure their relational contracts in the face of permanent shocks to the value of their relationships. In the context of the U.S. airline industry, we argue that major carriers enter self-enforcing agreements with their outsourced regional partners because a key aspect of airline operations—the exchange of landing slots under adverse weather—is formally noncontractible. We show empirically that major and regional airlines did not terminate their relational contracts after the 2008 crisis but rather, restructured the scope of such contracts in a way that restored their credibility. In particular, we show that a major airline was less likely to continue outsourcing a route to a regional partner after the 2008 crisis the lower the present discounted value of their preexisting relationship and hence, the larger the negative effect of the crisis on the relational contract’s 「self-enforcing range.」

參考文獻：Ricard Gil, Myongjin Kim, Giorgio Zanarone (2022) Relationships Under Stress: Relational Outsourcing in the U.S. Airline Industry After the 2008 Financial Crisis. Management Science 68(2):1256-1277.

26.醜聞、社會運動和變革：來自好萊塢#MeToo 的證據

社會運動有可能影響戰略決策的變化。在本文中，我們研究了由 Harvey Weinstein醜聞引發的#MeToo運動是否會導致好萊塢製片人與女性作家合作開展新電影項目的可能性發生變化。因為#MeToo影響了整個行業，我們利用製作人過去是否與Weinstein合作的差異來研究#MeToo是否以及如何促進變革。我們發現，與未關聯的製片人相比，之前與Weinstein有關聯的製片人在醜聞發生後與女性作家合作的可能性平均比之前高出35%，並且這種影響的大小隨着關聯的強度而增加。女性生產者是我們結果的主要驅動力，也許是因為她們比男性生產者更有可能與運動的原因產生共鳴，並且面臨實施變革的相對較低的成本。其他群體所做的改變，例如與Weinstein關係最密切的製作團隊和經驗較少的全男性團隊，可能更好地解釋為降低風險的動機。我們還發現，製片人不會通過僱傭更多的女性作家來犧牲作家的經驗，而且兩者都經歷過新的女性作家也從需求的增加中受益。我們的研究表明，尋求解決性別不平等問題的社會運動確實可以帶來有意義的變化。它還為思考是否以及在何種程度上可能在更廣泛的環境中發生變化提供了視角。

Socialmovements have the potential to effect change in strategic decisionmaking. In this paper, we examine whether the #MeToo movement, spurred by the Harvey Weinstein scandal, leads to changes in the likelihood of Hollywood producers working with female writers on new movie projects. Because #MeToo affected the entire industry, we use variation in whether producers had past collaborations with Weinstein to investigate whether and how #MeToo may spur change. We find that producers previously associated with Weinstein are, on average, about 35% more likely toworkwith femalewriters after the scandal than theywere before, relative to nonassociated producers, and the size of this effect increaseswith the intensity of the association. Female producers are the main drivers of our results, perhaps because they are more likely thanmale producers to resonatewith themovement’s cause and face relatively low costs of enacting change. Changes made by other groups, such as production teams with the most intense association withWeinstein and less experienced all-male teams, may be better explained bymotivations tomitigate risk.We also find that producers do not sacrificewriter experience by hiring more female writers and that both experienced and novice female writers have benefited from the increased demand. Our study shows that social movements that seek to address gender inequality can, indeed, lead to meaningful change. It also provides perspective for thinking aboutwhether, and towhat extent, changesmay occur in broader settings.

參考文獻：Hong Luo, Laurina Zhang (2022) Scandal, Social Movement, and Change: Evidence from #MeToo in Hollywood. Management Science 68(2):1278-1296.

27.衡量眾包功能對移動應用用戶參與度和保留率的影響：隨機現場實驗

移動應用程序最常被提及的問題是用戶參與度和留存率低。在本文中，我們使用隨機對照試驗來測試眾包在提高移動遊戲應用程序背景下的用戶參與度和留存率方面的影響。我們研究了兩個特定的眾包功能：提交內容的能力和訪問眾包內容的能力。我們發現，內容提交通過將用戶結束會話的風險相對於基線降低約11%，並將放棄遊戲應用程序的風險降低14%，顯著提高了參與度和留存率。相比之下，讓用戶能夠訪問眾包內容對參與度沒有顯著影響，但通過將放棄遊戲應用的風險降低13%來對留存率產生積極影響。令人驚訝的是，我們發現這兩個眾包功能的交互效果對用戶參與度是負面的。單獨而言，提交功能是通過授權用戶控制他們的產品使用體驗來表現出來，而訪問功能對保留的積極影響是通過內容的多樣性和新穎性來調節的。然而，這兩種效果並不互補。事實證明，當這兩個功能一起提供時，自己提交的授權會被其他提交的內容排擠，這主導了多樣性收益。眾包功能對不同的用戶群有不同的影響，重度用戶和長期使用的用戶受眾包功能的影響更大。

The most commonly cited issues with mobile apps are low user engagement and retention levels. In this paper, we use a randomized control trial to test the efficacy of crowdsourcing on enhancing user engagement and retention in the context ofmobile gaming apps. We examine two specific crowdsourcing features: the ability to submit content and the ability to access crowdsourced content. We find that the content submission significantly increases engagement and retention by reducing users』 hazard of ending a session by approximately 11% relative to the baseline and reducing the hazard of abandoning the game app by 14%. In contrast, giving users the ability to access crowdsourced content has no significant effect on engagement but has a positive effect on retention by reducing the hazard of abandoning the game app by 13%. Surprisingly, we find that the interaction effect of these two crowdsourced features is negative on user engagement. Individually, the submission feature manifests itself via empowering users to control their product use experience, whereas the access feature’s positive effect on retention is mediated by diversity and novelty of content. However, the two effects are not complementary. It turns out when these two features are given together, the empowerment enabled by one’s own submission is crowded out by others』 submissions, and this dominates the diversity benefit. Crowdsourcing features have heterogeneous impact on different user segments, with heavy users and users of longer tenure being more affected by the crowdsourcing features.

參考文獻：Zhuojun Gu, Ravi Bapna, Jason Chan, Alok Gupta (2022) Measuring the Impact of Crowdsourcing Features on Mobile App User Engagement and Retention: A Randomized Field Experiment. Management Science 68(2):1297-1329.

28.重新審視學術科學的創業商業化：來自「雙胞胎」發現的證據

哪些因素塑造了通過形成初創公司來對學術科學發現的商業化？先前的文獻已經確定了幾個促成因素，但沒有解決初期發現的商業潛力通常未被觀察到的基本問題，這可能會混淆推理。我們構建了大約20,000篇「雙胞胎」科學文章的樣本，這使我們能夠在進步的性質上保持不變的差異，並更準確地檢查預測創業商業化的特徵。在這個框架中，幾個普遍接受的因素似乎不會影響商業化。然而，我們發現，其前合作者包括「明星」系列企業家的學術科學家團隊更有可能通過初創公司將自己的發現商業化，更多跨學科的科學家團隊也是如此。

Which factors shape the commercialization of academic scientific discoveries via startup formation? Prior literature has identified several contributing factors but does not address the fundamental problem that the commercial potential of a nascent discovery is generally unobserved, which potentially confounds inference. We construct a sample of approximately 20,000 「twin」 scientific articles, which allows us to hold constant differences in the nature of the advance and more precisely examine characteristics that predict startup commercialization. In this framework, several commonly accepted factors appear not to influence commercialization. However, we find that teams of academic scientists whose former collaborators include 「star」 serial entrepreneurs are much more likely to commercialize their own discoveries via startups, as are more interdisciplinary teams of scientists.

參考文獻：Matt Marx, David H. Hsu (2022) Revisiting the Entrepreneurial Commercialization of Academic Science: Evidence from 「Twin」 Discoveries. Management Science 68(2):1330-1352.

29.比較收益公告和代理聲明中的非公認會計原則每股收益

我們通過使用美國證券交易委員會文件中手動收集的數據，比較公司年度收益公告和代理聲明中的非公認會計原則每股收益 (EPS)。我們發現資本市場激勵（合同激勵）的代理與公司在年度收益公告（代理報表）中披露非公認會計原則每股收益的相關性更高。然而，我們發現公司的非公認會計原則收益屬性存在系統性差異和排除取決於他們是否在收益公告和代理聲明中披露非公認會計原則每股收益。當公司在兩份文件中披露非公認會計原則每股收益時，我們發現非公認會計原則每股收益對於評估公司價值更有用。具體來說，這些公司更有可能：(1) 排除非經常性項目，(2) 排除不太持久的收益成分，以及 (3) 提供較不激進的非公認會計原則每股收益。我們的結果表明，在年度收益公告和代理聲明中披露時，非公認會計原則每股收益對投資者而言質量更高。我們提供了一些與在財務報告和薪酬合同中使用非公認會計原則每股收益指標一致的首批大樣本證據。

We compare non-GAAP earnings per share (EPS) in firms』 annual earnings announcements and proxy statements using hand-collected data from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings. We find that proxies for capital market incentives (contracting incentives) are more highly associated with firms』 disclosure of non-GAAP EPS in annual earnings announcements (proxy statements).However,we find systematic differences in the properties of firms』 non-GAAP earnings and exclusions depending on whether they disclose non-GAAP EPS in both the earnings announcement and the proxy statement. When firms disclose non-GAAP EPS in both documents, we find that non- GAAP EPS is more useful for assessing firm value. Specifically, these firms are more likely to: (1) exclude nonrecurring items, (2) exclude less persistent earnings components, and (3) provide less aggressive non-GAAP EPS. Our results suggest that non-GAAP EPS is higher in quality for investors when disclosed in both the annual earnings announcement and the proxy statement. We provide some of the first large-sample evidence consistent with the use of non-GAAP EPS metrics in both financial reporting and compensation contracting.

參考文獻：Dirk E. Black, Ervin L. Black, Theodore E. Christensen, Kurt H. Gee (2022) Comparing Non-GAAP EPS in Earnings Announcements and Proxy Statements. Management Science 68(2):1353-1377.

30.對沖基金激進主義和企業併購決策

本文表明，對沖基金激進主義與併購 (M&A) 和報價溢價的減少以及股票和經營業績的增加有關。激進對沖基金通過減少不良併購、多元化併購以及對具有多個業務部門的公司的併購來提高目標公司的併購績效。激進對沖基金通過影響其治理實踐來改善目標公司的併購決策。研究表明，我們的結果不太可能由選擇偏差驅動。總體而言，激進對沖基金通過提高目標公司併購活動的效率，在公司控制市場中發揮着重要作用。

This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms』 M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms』 M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms』 M&A activities through interventions.

參考文獻：Szu-Yin (Jennifer) Wu, Kee H. Chung (2022) Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions. Management Science 68(2):1378-1403.

31. 企業所得稅對投資區位的影響:基於企業總部搬遷證據的分析

本研究探討了轄區的公司稅和其他政策對公司總部選址決策的影響。以各州不同時期的國有企業所得稅稅率變化為背景，我們發現，總部所在地的國有企業所得稅稅率每提高一個百分點，企業將總部遷出州外的可能性就會增加16.8%。而總部法定利率的同等下降將使總部搬遷的可能性降低9.1%。國家分配製度中稅收政策的獨特特徵，為有力地解釋稅收如何推動這一效應提供了支撐。我們的分析還表明，國家所得稅特徵影響總部遷移的目的地。我們對企業決策研究的貢獻在於，展示了國家所得稅如何影響對公司和國家有重大經濟影響的真實企業的決策。

This study examines the effects of jurisdictions』 corporate taxes and other policies on firms』 headquarters (HQ) location decisions. Using changes in state corporate income tax rates across time and states as the setting, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the HQ state corporate income tax rate increases the likelihood of firms relocating their HQ out of the state by 16.8%, and an equivalent decrease in the HQ state rate decreases the likelihood of HQ relocations by 9.1%. Exploiting the unique tax policy features within the state apportionment system lends strong support to the interpretation that taxation drives this effect. Our analyses also demonstrate that state income tax features affect the destination of the HQ move. We contribute to the literature on corporate decision making by showing how state income taxation affects a real corporate decision that has significant economic consequences for the company and the state.

參考文獻：Travis Chow, Sterling Huang, Kenneth J. Klassen, Jeffrey Ng. (2022). The Influence of Corporate Income Taxes on Investment Location: Evidence from Corporate Headquarters Relocations. Management Science, 68(2): 1404–1425.

32. 高額回報溢價的真實一面

已有文獻研究表明，公司股票交易活動的增加與股票未來異常收益(高額回報溢價)相關，並將這一現象解釋為可見性增加導致資本成本降低的證據。基於這一解釋，我們調查了增加的交易活動是否會導致企業實際行為的變化。我們發現異常交易量、未來投資支出與融資現金流量之間存在正相關關係。這種積極的關係沒有被投資相關新聞的出現或其他公司披露或隨後的盈利信息所包含，而是蘊含在財務約束高的公司和投資者認知度較低的公司。

Prior literature demonstrates that increased trading activity of a firm’s stock is associated with abnormal future stock returns (the high-volume return premium) and interprets this phenomenon as evidence that increased visibility generates reductions in cost of capital. Motivated by this interpretation, we investigate whether increased trading activity entails changes in real corporate actions. We document a positive relation between abnormal trading volume, future investment expenditures, and financing cash flows. This positive relation is not subsumed by the arrival of investment-related news or other corporate disclosures or by subsequent earnings information and is concentrated among firms with high financial constraints and firms with lower levels of investor recognition.

參考文獻：Doron Israeli, Ron Kaniel, Suhas A. Sridharan. (2022). The Real Side of the High-Volume Return Premium. Management Science, 68(2): 1426–1449.

33.內部紓困與外部紓困：是敵是友？

本文分析了內部紓困和外部紓困政策對銀行融資成本、貸款監管激勵和融資能力的影響。事後證明，在一個包含道德風險和兩個投資階段的模型中，全面內部紓困是應對一家破產銀行的最優政策。與外部紓困不同，它允許政府在不動用扭曲性稅收的情況下對銀行進行資本重組。然而，其結果是，投資者期望的是內部紓困，而不是外部紓困。首先，這提高了銀行的債務成本，抑制了銀行家進行監管的動機。當道德風險嚴重時，除非政府預先承諾另一種解決政策，否則這種不一致性會導致信貸市場崩潰，使得生產性項目得不到融。最優的政策要麼是「內部紓困」與「外部紓困」相結合（即使用最低數額的公共轉移資金來降低銀行的債務）或清算成本，這將由政府根據道德風險的嚴重程度和部分外部紓困的影子成本決定。

This paper analyzes the effects of bail-in and bailout policies on banks』 funding costs, incentives for loan monitoring, and financing capacity. In a model with moral hazard and two investment stages, a full bail-in turns out to be, ex post, the optimal policy to deal with a failing bank. Unlike a bailout, it allows the government to recapitalize the bank without resorting to distortionary taxes. As a consequence, however, investors expect bail-ins rather than bailouts. Ex ante, this raises banks』 cost of debt and depresses bankers』 incentives to monitor. When moral hazard is severe, this time inconsistency leads to a credit market collapse in which productive projects are not financed, unless the government precommits to an alternative resolution policy. The optimal policy is either a combination of bail-in and bailout—in which the government uses a minimal amount of public transfers to lower banks』 cost of debt—or liquidation, depending on the severity of moral hazard and the shadow cost of the partial bailout.

參考文獻：Lorenzo Pandolfi. (2022). Bail-in and Bailout: Friends or Foes?. Management Science, 68(2): 1450–1468.

34. 不確定性與影子銀行危機:來自動態模型的估計

影子銀行在現代金融體系中發揮着重要作用，可以說是導致2007-2009年金融危機的關鍵漏洞的來源。本文開發了一個包含不確定性波動和內生銀行違約的定量框架來研究影子銀行的動態。本文認為，危機期間資產回報不確定性的增加，會導致息差飆升，使影子銀行在短期債券市場上滾動還債的成本更高。結果，這些金融機構被迫去槓桿化，導致信貸中介的減少。該模型使用美國影子銀行的銀行級數據集進行估算。參數估計表明，不確定性衝擊可以解釋影子銀行部門72%的資產收縮和70%的去槓桿化。期限錯配和資產賤賣放大了不確定性衝擊的影響。僅憑對銀行資產回報第一時刻的衝擊、金融衝擊或賤賣成本衝擊，無法重現危機期間銀行間利差大幅飆升、大幅去槓桿化或美國影子銀行業收縮的局面。該模型還可以進行政策試驗。本文分析了非常規貨幣政策如何有助於對抗銀行間利差的上升，從而穩定信貸供應。考慮到銀行的道德風險，本文發現政府救助可能會適得其反，因為它可能會導致影子銀行更大膽的冒險，特別是當救援決定是基於銀行的特點。

Shadow banks play an important role in the modern financial system and are arguably the source of key vulnerabilities that led to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. I develop a quantitative framework with uncertainty fluctuations and endogenous bank default to study the dynamics of shadow banking. I argue that the increase in asset return uncertainty during the crisis results in a spread spike, making it more costly for shadow banks to roll over their debt in the short-term debt market. As a result, these financial institutions are forced to deleverage, leading to a decrease in credit intermediation. The model is estimated using a bank-level data set of shadow banks in the United States. The parameter estimates imply that uncertainty shocks can explain 72% of asset contraction and 70% of deleveraging in the shadow banking sector. Maturity mismatch and asset fire-sales amplify the impact of the uncertainty shocks. First-moment shocks to bank asset return, financial shocks, or fire-sale cost shocks alone cannot reproduce the large interbank spread spike, dramatic deleveraging, or contraction in the U.S. shadow banking sector during the crisis. The model also allows for policy experiments. I analyze how unconventional monetary policies can help to counter the rise in the interbank spread, thus stabilizing the credit supply. Taking bank moral hazard into consideration, I find that government bailout might be counterproductive as it might result in more aggressive risk-taking among shadow banks, especially when bailout decisions are based on bank characteristics.

參考文獻：Xu Tian. (2022). Uncertainty and the Shadow Banking Crisis: Estimates from a Dynamic Model. Management Science, 68(2): 1469–1496.

35. 內幕交易、競爭和真實活動操縱

我們考慮了一個由經理人操縱公司的真實活動以預測內幕交易機會的背景。管理者選擇的生產數量嚴格高於不存在內幕交易時選擇的數量，這意味着企業利潤較低，但消費者剩餘較高。通過靜態比較，我們表明，行業的競爭程度、經理目前在公司的股權、和成本信息的準確性可以減輕生產過剩的現象。我們通過幾個拓展研究分析了內幕交易的影響，包括非對稱的所有權結構，潛在的橫向合併和共同做市商。

We consider a setting where managers manipulate the firms』 real activities in anticipation of insider trading opportunities. Managers choose strictly higher production quantities than the quantities chosen absent insider trading, implying lower firm profit but higher consumer surplus. Through comparative statics, we show the overproduction is mitigated by the degree of competition in the industry, the manager’s current equity stake in the firm, and the precision of cost information. We also analyze the effects of insider trading in several extensions including asymmetric ownership structure, potential horizontal merger, and common market maker.

參考文獻：Hui Chen, Bjorn N. Jorgensen. (2022). Insider Trading, Competition, and Real Activities Manipulation. Management Science, 68(2): 1497–1511.

36.高管網絡中心性和企業報告

本文研究了公司報告與高管網絡中心性之間的關係。高管網絡中心性衡量的是高管在外部領導者組成的龐大網絡中的相對地位。本文發現，高中心性首席執行官(CEO)和首席財務官(CFO)通常比低中心性CEO和CFO更容易出現財務誤報。同時發現，CFO網絡中心性的影響要大於CEO對財務誤報的影響。進一步的分析表明，內部治理機制對高中心性高管的監控作用非常有限，對高中心性CFO的經理人市場的約束也較弱。本文的研究結果適用於受CFO連通性外部衝擊影響的子樣本，並且適用於一系列替代規範（包括使用CFO固定效應）。綜上所述，本文的研究結果表明，公司報告可能會受到高管社交網絡位置的影響，高中心性的CFO會利用他們的社會權力做出不利的公司報告決策，以獲得個人利益。

This paper investigates the association of corporate reporting and executive network centrality, which measures an executive’s relative position in a massive network consisting of outside corporate leaders. I find that high-centrality chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) are generally more likely to engage in financial misreporting than low-centrality CEOs and CFOs. I also find that the influence of CFO network centrality is greater than that of CEOs in financial misreporting. Further analyses show that the monitoring effect of internal governance mechanisms on high-centrality executives is very limited and that the discipline of the managerial labor market is weaker for high-centrality CFOs as well. My results hold for a subsample subject to exogenous shocks to CFO connectedness and are robust to a series of alternative specifications including using CFO fixed effects. Taken together, my findings suggest that corporate reporting can be influenced by executives』 social network position, with high-centrality CFOs using their social power to make adverse corporate reporting decisions to gain personal benefits.

參考文獻：Jing He. (2022). Executive Network Centrality and Corporate Reporting. Management Science, 68(2): 1512–1536.

37. 目標、可預見性和績效

針對既定的投資組合，我們研究了市場時機選擇策略，以達到特定的風險或回報目標。目標固定的風險水平會導致在更好的投資機會下增加投資，而目標固定的預期回報則相反。理論和數值分析表明，在正常的投資機會範圍內，風險目標比回報目標在各種指標上產生更好的無條件績效。通過對構造的一般的股票投資組合進行實證，我們進一步強調了由於其固有的低樣本外預測能力，導致回報目標在實際上的不可行性。相比之下，風險目標傾向於增強無條件的穩定性和績效。

We study market-timing strategies on a given portfolio to achieve a particular risk or return target. Targeting a constant risk level leads to increasing investment at better investment opportunities, whereas targeting a constant expected return does the opposite. Theoretical and numerical analysis shows that within the usual ranges of investment opportunities, risk targeting generates better unconditional performance than return targeting across a wide range of metrics. Empirical analysis with commonly constructed stock portfolios further highlights the practical infeasibility of return targeting due to the inherently low out-of-sample predicting power. By contrast, risk targeting tends to enhance unconditional stability and performance.

參考文獻：Francisco Peñaranda, Liuren Wu. (2022). Targets, Predictability, and Performance. Management Science, 68(2): 1537–1555.

38. 管理層受託責任變更的第三方後果:基於審計人員持續經營意見的案例研究

本研究探討管理受託責任對公司接受持續經營意見（GC）的可能性的影響。我們利用了1991年一項頗有影響力的法律裁決，該裁決擴大了公司董事和官員的受託責任，有利於接近破產的特拉華州公司的債權人。通過雙重差分檢驗，我們發現，在對接近破產的特拉華州公司進行裁決之後，GC的意見有所增加。進一步的測試表明，在裁決之後，第一類審計意見的錯誤有所增加，而審計風險沒有變化。額外的分析還表明，在裁決之後，接近破產的特拉華州公司不太可能在收到GC報告後解僱他們的審計師。總的來說，我們的發現與下述現象一致，即增加經理和董事對債權人的信託責任，會對審計師施加更少的壓力，並允許他們提出更多的GC意見。我們的研究結果強調了管理受託責任的變化會引起重要的第三方後果。

This study examines the effect of managerial fiduciary duties on the likelihood of firms receiving going concern (GC) opinions from their auditors. We exploit an influential 1991 legal ruling that expanded fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers in favor of creditors for near-insolvent Delaware firms. Our difference-in-differences test reveals an increase in GC opinions following the ruling for near-insolvent Delaware firms. Further tests indicate an increase in type I audit opinion errors and no change in audit risk after the ruling. Additional analysis shows that, after the ruling, near-insolvent Delaware firms are less likely to dismiss their auditors following the receipt of a GC report. Overall, our findings are consistent with managers and directors with increased fiduciary duties toward creditors exerting less pressure on auditors and allowing them to reveal more GC opinions. Our results highlight important third-party consequences of changes in managerial fiduciary duties.

參考文獻：Liang Tan, Santhosh Ramalingegowda, Yong Yu. (2022). Third-Party Consequences of Changes in Managerial Fiduciary Duties: The Case of Auditors』 Going Concern Opinions. Management Science, 68(2): 1556–1572.

39. 特殊波動率和股票回報的短期和長期成分分析

為了研究股票收益的特殊波動率在不同時間區間內的動態變化，以及特殊波動率與預期收益之間的關係，本文建立並估計了一個由短期和長期成分組成的特殊波動率簡化模型。符合條件的短期和長期成分分別與股票預期收益呈正相關和負相關關係。導致短期成分與股票收益之間呈現正相關關係的原因可能是，投資者在面臨交易摩擦時，會因承擔特殊波動風險而需要補償，且持有的投資組合多樣性不足。長期成分與股票收益之間的負相關關係可能反映了一個事實，即具有高長期特質波動率的股票受系統風險因素的影響較小，因此收益較低。此外，低風險暴露的股票是以高特質波動率為特徵，這為基於實物期權的機制解釋這種負相關提供了支持。特別是，一個擁有大量增長期權的公司的系統風險，在很大程度上取決於這些期權的風險暴露。當特質波動性在長期內增加時，由於凸性，增長型期權的價值可能會顯著上升。而相對於系統性風險因素，因為增長期權的價值降低了，增長期權的系統性風險可能會下降。

To capture the dynamics of idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns over different horizons and investigate the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and expected stock returns, this paper develops and estimates a parsimonious model of idiosyncratic volatility consisting of a short-run and a long-run component. The conditional short-run and long-run components are found to be positively and negatively related to expected stock returns, respectively. The positive relation between the short-run component and stock returns may be caused by investors requiring compensation for bearing idiosyncratic volatility risk when facing trading frictions and hold underdiversified portfolios. The negative relationship between the long-run component and stock returns may reflect the fact that stocks with high long-run idiosyncratic volatility are less exposed to systematic risk factors and, hence, earn lower returns. Moreover, the low-risk exposure of stocks characterized by high idiosyncratic volatility lends support to real-option-based mechanisms to explain this negative relation. In particular, the systematic risk of a firm with abundant growth options crucially depends upon the risk exposure of these options. The value of growth options could rise significantly because of convexity when the increase in idiosyncratic volatility occurs over long horizons. And growth options』 systematic risk could fall because the relative magnitude of their value in relation to systematic risk factors decreases.

參考文獻：Yunting Liu. (2022). The Short-Run and Long-Run Components of Idiosyncratic Volatility and Stock Returns. Management Science, 68(2): 1573–1589.More of Your Text....