鑽石舞台

題目：Putting Terror in Its Place: An Experiment on Mitigating Fears of Terrorism among the American Public

作者：Daniel Silverman，卡耐基梅隆大學政治與戰略研究所助理教授，他的研究重點是暴力衝突的動力學，特別是衝突的心理動機的減輕。Daniel Kent，俄亥俄州立大學政治學博士，他的論文側重於使用機器學習方法來預測國際衝突和檢測社會網絡的溢出效應。Christopher F. Gelpi，俄亥俄州立大學默森國際安全研究中心主任，他的主要研究興趣是國際軍事衝突的動因和解決。

摘要：美國人每年死於恐怖襲擊的幾率大約為350萬分之一。然而，超過40%的美國人堅持認為，他們或他們的家人大有可能成為恐怖襲擊的受害者。恐怖主義風險的誇大估計有沒有可能回歸到現實水平？鑑於美國在「反恐戰爭」上花費了數萬億美元，這個問題不僅在理論上，而且在實踐上有着重要意義。為了進行調查，本文採用實驗方法，評估人們在接觸到有關恐怖主義的相對風險的事實信息時，是否會更新他們對恐怖主義的信念。本文發現，公眾對恐怖主義的恐懼和對打擊恐怖主義的需求可以隨着信息的完善而急劇減少，基本下降到9·11事件前的水平，並在兩周後的調查中保持這一狀態。這些結果表明，打擊恐怖主義的非直接代價可能依賴更多的背景和觀點的供給。

An American’s yearly chance of being killed by a terrorist attack sits at roughly 1 in 3.5 million. Yet, over 40 percent of Americans consistently believe that they or their family members are likely to be a terror victim. Can these inflated estimates of the risks of terrorism be brought closer to reality? With trillions of dollars spent on the 「War on Terror,」 this question is not just theoretically but practically important. In order to investigate, we use an experimental approach assessing whether people update their beliefs about terrorism when given factual information about the relative risks it presents. We find that public fear of terrorism and demand for countering it can be sharply reduced with better information, dropping essentially to pre-9/11 levels after the treatment and staying that way two weeks later. These results suggest that countering the indirect costs of terrorism may largely require providing more context and perspective.

題目：What’s Fair in International Politics? Equity, Equality, and Foreign Policy Attitudes

作者：Kathleen Powers，達特茅斯學院政府系助理教授，著有《國際政治中的民族主義》一書；Joshua D. Kertzer，哈佛大學政府系教授，著有《國際政治中的決心》一書。Deborah Jordan Brooks，達特茅斯學院政府系助理教授；Stephen G. Brooks，達特茅斯學院政府系教授，著有《國際安全的政治經濟學》、《失衡的世界：國際關係和美國首要地位的挑戰》等書。

摘要：對公平的關注如何影響外交政策的偏好？本文表明，公平關乎公正和平等兩個面向，二者可以闡明外交政策重大辯論的結構。通過對一個全國性的美國人樣本進行實地調查，本文表明，不同類型的美國人對公平的思考方式不同，並影響了外交政策的偏好：強調公正的人對責任共擔的關注更加敏感，一旦其他國家沒有投入應有的份額，他們就更不可能支持美國在海外的參與，並且往往比強調平等的人支持有系統性差異的外交政策。國際關係學者如果只關注公平的平等面向，就會誤解公平問題在世界政治中的重要性。

How do concerns about fairness shape foreign policy preferences? In this article, we show that fairness has two faces—one concerning equity, the other concerning equality—and that taking both into account can shed light on the structure of important foreign policy debates. Fielding an original survey on a national sample of Americans, we show that different types of Americans think about fairness in different ways, and that these fairness concerns shape foreign policy preferences: individuals who emphasize equity are far more sensitive to concerns about burden sharing, are far less likely to support US involvement abroad when other countries aren’t paying their fair share, and often support systematically different foreign policies than individuals who emphasize equality. As long as IR scholars focus only on the equality dimension of fairness, we miss much about how fairness concerns matter in world politics.

題目：Quick on the Draw: American Negativity Bias and Costly Signals in International Relations

作者：SeokJoon Kim，聖母大學國際安全中心博士後研究員。

摘要：國家會向國內外的受眾發出意圖信號，但並不總是被相信。為什麼人們相信某些國家的信號而不相信其他國家的？通過對美國公眾的代表性樣本進行調查實驗，本研究發現，個人在評估國家信號的可信度時有一種消極偏見。他們把其他國家的攻擊性行動視為深層次的敵意，而對和解姿態的可信度保持懷疑。實驗結果顯示，調動一小部分軍隊被認為是足夠可信的侵略性行動，而即使是撤走一大部分軍隊也不被認為是和解性的。這裡發現的心理學機制為個人處理嵌入國家信號中的信息的理論化奠定了堅實的基礎，並能提高我們對信號的理解。

States signal their intentions to domestic and foreign audiences but are not always believed. Why do people believe some state signals but not others? Using a survey experiment on a representative sample of the US public, this study finds that individuals have a negativity bias when assessing the credibility of state signals. They take other states』 aggressive actions as evidence of deep hostility but are skeptical of the credibility of conciliatory gestures. The experimental result shows that the mobilization of a small proportion of an army is perceived credible enough as an aggressive action, while the removal of even a large proportion is not perceived as conciliatory. The psychological mechanism found here is a strong foundation for theorizing about how individuals process information embedded in state signals and can improve our understanding of signaling.

題目：Atomic Ambiguity: Event Data Evidence on Nuclear Latency and International Cooperation

作者：Eleonora Mattiacci，阿默斯特學院政治科學專業助理教授；Rupal N. Mehta，內布拉斯加大學林肯分校政治科學系副教授；Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark，喬治亞理工學院薩姆納恩國際事務學院副教授。

摘要：兩用技術如何影響合作？本研究探討了核潛力（核武器的技術前體）的發展如何影響美國對其持有者的合作姿態。本文認為，核潛力的模糊性造成了對其持有者意圖的不確定性，並影響了合作。利用事件數據，本文發現，一個國家擁有公開的實驗室規模的核濃縮和後處理設施與美國對該國的更大的合作姿態明顯相關。這些姿態可能成為阻遏這些國家間核擴散的有效工具。然而，當核潛力國家在實驗室和更進一步的「試點」階段都參與到對其設施進行保密的協同努力中時，這種關係就會發生逆轉。這些結果對新興軍民兩用技術對國際安全的廣泛影響具有重要意義。

How does dual-use technology influence cooperation? This study explores how the development of nuclear latency (the technological precursors to nuclear weapons) affects U.S. cooperative overtures toward its possessors. We argue that the ambiguous nature of nuclear latency creates uncertainty about the intentions of its possessors and impacts cooperation. Using event data, we find that a state’s possession of overt lab-scale enrichment and reprocessing facilities is significantly correlated with greater cooperative overtures from the United States toward that country. These overtures may serve as effective tools to counter nuclear proliferation among these states. Yet, when latent states engage in a concerted effort to keep their facilities secret, both at the lab and a more advanced 「pilot」 stage, this relationship is reversed. These results carry important implications for the impact of emerging, dual-use technologies on international security broadly.

題目：Does Insurgent Selective Punishment Deter Collaboration? Evidence from the Drone War in Pakistan

作者：Vincent Bauer，美國海軍分析中心數據科學團隊的研究科學家；Michael J. Reese，芝加哥大學國際關係委員會高級講師；Keven Ruby，芝加哥大學「芝加哥安全與威脅項目」高級研究員。

摘要：內戰研究學者長期以來一直認為，非國家行為者可以使用選擇性懲罰來減少與國家級對手的合作。然而，幾乎沒有系統證據證實這一說法，也沒有對起作用的機制進行調查。本文從巴基斯坦無人機戰爭中提供了相關證據。巴基斯坦部落地區的武裝分子開展了殘酷的反間諜活動，目的是減少與美國的合作。本文的分析將合作者被殺數據集與無人機襲擊結果數據相結合，並發現，在合作者被殺後，空襲殺死的激進分子領導人和武裝分子的數量減少了一半，而且這種抑制效應很可能通過阻止未來的間諜活動而發揮作用。除了提供選擇性懲罰假說提供實證證實之外，本文還表明，無人機項目存在一個未被承認的弱點，即針對當地盟友和合作者的報復，這限制了其作為長期反恐工具的有效性。

Scholars of civil wars have long argued that non-state actors can use selective punishment to reduce collaboration with state adversaries. However, there is little systematic evidence confirming this claim, nor investigation into the mechanisms at play. In this paper, we provide such evidence from the drone war in Pakistan. Militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas engaged in a brutal counterespionage campaign with the aim of reducing collaboration with the United States. Our analysis combines a novel dataset of collaborator killings with data on drone strike outcomes. We find that strikes killed half as many militant leaders and fighters following collaborator killings and that this suppressive effect likely works by deterring spying in the future. Beyond providing an empirical confirmation of the selective punishment hypothesis, our paper suggests an unacknowledged vulnerability of the drone program to reprisals against local allies and collaborators that limits its effectiveness as a long-term tool of counterterrorism.

題目：Oil Price Shocks and Conflict Escalation: Onshore versus Offshore

作者：JørgenJuel Andersen，BI挪威商學院經濟學副教授；Frode Martin Nordvik，挪威克里斯蒂安斯塔德大學經濟、創新與技術學院副教授；Andrea Tesei，倫敦瑪麗女王大學經濟與金融學院副教授。

摘要：本文重新考慮石油和衝突的關係，並把重點放在石油資源的位置上。本文調查了從1962年到2009年間的132個國家，發現石油暴利加劇了陸上富裕國家的衝突，而緩解了沿海富裕國家的衝突。本文使用一個模型來說明這些相反的影響如何可以用戰鬥力機制來解釋，即政府可以利用海上石油收入來提高其戰鬥能力，而陸上石油可能被反對派組織掠奪來資助叛亂。本文提供了支持這一解釋的實證證據：石油價格的暴利增加了陸上富裕國家活躍叛亂組織的數量和力量，而在海上富裕國家則增強了政府的力量。

We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls escalate conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they de-escalate conflict in offshore-rich countries. We use a model to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil price windfalls increase both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.

題目：Measuring Human Rights Abuse from Access to Information Requests

作者：Sarah A. V. Ellington，特拉華大學政治學與國際關係博士；Benjamin E. Bagozzi，特拉華大學政治學與國際關係副教授；Daniel Berliner，倫敦經濟學院政府系政治科學與公共政策副教授。

摘要：現有的侵犯人權措施往往只能獲得國家的年度數據。一些更細粒度的測量方法受限於數據來源表現出時空不準確性或報告偏差。為了應對這些挑戰，並更廣泛地增加有效人權衡量標準的多樣性，本研究首次從公民與政府互動的文本記錄中提供了衡量人權侵犯行為的量化努力，利用2003年6月以來向墨西哥聯邦政府提出的超過150萬次信息獲取（ATI）請求的數據集，採用監督學習分類方法來確定這些請求中屬於各種類型侵犯人權行為的子集。這一監督學習結果已根據（i）與墨西哥過去的人權侵犯有關的黃金標準ATI請求，以及(ii)一些次國家和次年度的公認侵犯人權的外部措施予以驗證。在此過程中，本文證明，相對於現有的人權數據集和變量，公民提交的ATI請求文本對人權侵犯行為的測量可以提供兼具高有效性和顯著時空特異性的標準。

Existing measures of human rights abuses are often only available at the country-year level. Several more fine-grained measures exhibit spatio-temporal inaccuracies or reporting biases due to the primary sources upon which they rely. To address these challenges, and to increase the diversity of available human rights measures more generally, this study provides the first quantitative effort to measure human rights abuses from textual records of citizen-government interactions. Using a dataset encompassing over 1.5 million access-to-information (ATI) requests made to the Mexican federal government from June 2003 onward, supervised classification is used to identify the subset of these requests that pertain to human rights abuses of various types. The results from this supervised machine learning exercise are validated against (i) gold standard ATI requests pertaining to past human rights abuses in Mexico and (ii) several accepted external measures of sub-national and sub-annual human rights abuses. In doing so, we demonstrate that the measurement of human rights abuses from citizen-submitted ATI request texts can provide measures of human rights abuse that exhibit both high validity and notable spatio-temporal specificity, relative to existent human rights datasets and variables.

編譯 | 楊佳霖

審校 |李博軒

排版 | 張譽璇