鑽石舞台

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1. 審計師因審計質量低而獲得獎勵？來自保險行業審計師從寬案例

利用保險行業的獨特披露，本文發現審計師似乎允許客戶在會計估計中利用自由裁量權來操縱虧損以報告利潤（即審計師從寬處理）。審計準則和美國證券交易委員會的指導意見指出，審計師在評估錯報的重要性時，應將錯報是否將損失轉化為利潤作為定性因素。文章發現，審計機構的寬鬆程度與隨後的市場份額變化呈正相關，這種影響出於留住現有的、非操作客戶動機。在普遍性測試中，文章發現當銀行業使用特定披露時，以及當所有行業使用發表持續經營意見的可能性來衡量審計師從寬處理時，結論依然成立。本文結果突出了審計師可能因從寬處理而獲得獎勵，特別是當管理層重視財務報告自由裁量權，並且審計師可以避免公開審計失敗時。

Using unique disclosures from the insurance industry, we identify instances where auditors plausibly allow clients to opportunistically utilize discretion in accounting estimates to manipulate losses to reported profits (i.e., auditor lenience). Auditing standards and SEC guidance state that auditors should consider whether a misstatement shifts a loss to a profit as a qualitative factor when evaluating the materiality of misstatements. We find that audit office lenience is positively associated with subsequent market share changes. The effect is driven by increases in the likelihood of keeping existing, non-manipulating clients. In generalizability tests, we find similar inferences in the banking industry when using bank-specific disclosures and across all industries when measuring auditor lenience using likelihood of issuing going-concern opinions. These results highlight settings where auditors may be rewarded for lenience, specifically when management values financial reporting discretion and auditors can avoid publicized audit failures.

論文原文：Ege, M. S. , & Stuber, S. B. . (2021). Are auditors rewarded for low audit quality? The case of auditor lenience in the insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics(2), 101424.

2. 搖擺不定：相對業績評估如何影響企業的風險承擔

本文認為，相對績效評估(RPE)合同引入了焦點公司和同行公司之間的「競賽」。本文探究一家公司的風險承擔能力是否會被其CEO贏得「競賽」的動機所改變。研究結果發現，在評估期的剩餘時間裡，在中期業績相對於同行表現不佳的公司會比中期業績較好的公司承擔更大的風險。當中期評估日期更接近評估期結束並且贏得競爭對CEO來說更重要時，這種影響會更強。總之，本文結果表明，RPE合同為CEO創造了錦標賽激勵，並顯著影響了企業的風險承擔。

We argue that relative performance evaluation (RPE) contracts introduce a tournament among the focal firm and peer firms. We test whether a firm's riskiness is altered by its CEO's incentive to win the tournament. We find that a firm that performed poorly relative to its peers during an interim period takes more risk in the remainder of the evaluation period than a firm with better interim performance. This effect is stronger when the interim assessment date is closer to the end of the evaluation period and when winning the competition is more important to the CEO. Together, our results suggest that RPE contracts create tournament incentives for CEOs and significantly affect corporate risk taking.

論文原文：Do, T. , Zhang, H. , & Zuo, L. . (2021). Rocking the boat: how relative performance evaluation affects corporate risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics(1), 101425.

3. 對貸方的金融衝擊和金融契約的構成

本文提供的證據表明，對貸方的金融衝擊會影響債務合同中金融契約的構成。通過使用兩種衡量貸款人特定衝擊的指標——發生在借款人所在地區和行業之外的貸款人公司貸款組合中的違約，以及非公司貸款違約——本文表明，貸款人通過增加債務合同中基於業績而非基於資本的契約數量和嚴格程度來應對金融衝擊。本文研究了這一結果兩種可能的路徑。研究結果發現了與貸款人使用更嚴格的控制權相一致的證據，是出於對資本枯竭的擔憂(資本渠道)，以及關於貸款機構自身篩選能力的新信息(學習渠道)。本文結果表明，貸款人偏好會影響會計信息在債務合同中的使用。

We provide evidence that financial shocks to lenders influence the composition of financial covenants in debt contracts. Using two distinct measures of lender-specific shocks—defaults in a lender's corporate loan portfolio that occur outside the borrower's region and industry, and non-corporate loan delinquencies—we show that lenders respond to financial shocks by increasing the number and strictness of performance-based but not of capital-based covenants in debt contracts. We examine two possible channels for this result. We find evidence consistent with lenders using stricter control rights because of concerns about capital depletion (a capital channel) and because of new information about lenders' own screening ability (a learning channel). Our results indicate that lender preferences influence how accounting information is used in debt contracts.

論文原文：Christensen, H. B. , D Macciocchi, Morris, A. , & Nikolaev, V. V. . (2021). Financial shocks to lenders and the composition of financial covenants. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 101426.

4. 驗證外生衝擊的必要性:股東派生訴訟、普適性法律和企業行為

最近的幾項研究認為，普適性法律(UD)的採用增加了與股東派生訴訟相關的程序障礙，從而導致訴訟風險的下降。本研究考察了UD法如何影響股東派生訴訟風險的發生和相關決策。本文發現，從1996年到2015年，UD法的採用對股東派生訴訟沒有顯著影響。本研究也沒有發現UD法律影響採用激進會計手段、自願披露、高管薪酬或公司治理決策的證據。總體而言，本文發現對使用UD法作為訴訟風險的外生衝擊的有效性提出了質疑。

Several recent studies argue that the adoption of universal demand (UD) laws represent an exogenous decline in litigation risk by increasing the procedural hurdles associated with shareholder derivative litigation. This study examines how UD laws affect the incidence of derivative litigation risk and related decisions. We show that the adoption of UD laws had no meaningful impact on derivative litigation from 1996 to 2015. We also find no evidence that UD laws affect aggressive accounting, voluntary disclosure, executive compensation, or corporate governance decisions. Collectively, our findings cast doubt on the validity of using UD laws as an exogenous shock to litigation risk.

論文原文：Dcd, A. , Lk, B. , Mi, B. , & St, B. . (2021). The need to validate exogenous shocks: shareholder derivative litigation, universal demand laws and firm behavior - sciencedirect. Journal of Accounting and Economics.

5. 論收益和現金流作為未來現金流的預測者

是否正如財務會計準則委員會的概念框架(FASB，1978)所預測的那樣，應計制收益是否比經營現金流本身提供了更好的關於未來經營現金流的信息？雖然這是會計學中因為涉及應計制增量信息的一個基礎性問題，但目前學術界仍未對其進行測試。本文發現，按權責發生制計算的等值盈利指標預測能力強於營運現金流的預測能力。當考慮到公司收益和未來現金流之間的橫截面差異時，這一結果變得更加明顯。事實上，即使是「底線」收益也具有與運營現金流類似的解釋能力。

Do accruals-based earnings provide better information about future operating cash flows than do operating cash flows themselves, as predicted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's conceptual framework (FASB, 1978)? While this is a foundational issue in accounting, because it addresses the information added by accrual accounting methods, testing it remains unsettled. We show that when comparing the predictive ability of operating cash flows with that of an equivalent earnings measure calculated on an accrual basis, earnings outperform operating cash flows. The result becomes more pronounced when allowance is made for cross-sectional differences in the relation between firms' earnings and future cash flows. In fact, even 「bottom line」 earnings then have similar explanatory power as operating cash flows.

論文原文：Ball, R. , & Nikolaev, V. . (2021). On earnings and cash flows as predictors of future cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics.

6.對2008年金融危機期間貸款損失準備不足的基於信息質量解釋

本文研究了2008年金融危機期間商業銀行的貸款損失準備金的不足是否因為銀行經理依賴低質量信息來估計貸款損失。為了衡量在危機前銀行抵押貸款收集的信息質量，本文創建了一個銀行抵押貸款欺詐風險指數(EFI)，該指數反映了抵押貸款申請中借款人收入的誇大情況。本研究發現在高風險社區發放更多貸款的銀行在危機期間的貸款損失準備金反而較少。本文研究與欺詐性借款人信息對銀行的貸款損失準備金產生不利影響的假設一致。

I study whether commercial banks' loan loss allowances were inadequate during the 2008 financial crisis because bank managers relied on low-quality information to estimate loan losses. To measure the quality of information collected on bank-held mortgages prior to the crisis, I create a bank exposure-to-mortgage fraud risk index (EFI) that captures overstatement of borrower income in mortgage applications. I find banks that originated more loans in high-risk neighborhoods had less adequate loan loss allowances during the crisis. My study is consistent with the hypothesis that fraudulent borrower information adversely affected banks』 loan loss provisioning.

論文原文：Yang, L. . (2021). An information quality-based explanation for loan loss allowance inadequacy during the 2008 financial crisis. Journal of Accounting and Economics.

7. 客戶對共享審計合作夥伴信息溢出的擔憂

本文假設同一產品市場中的公司在擔心可能的信息溢出時會避免共享同一審計合伙人。與假設一致，研究結果發現當產品市場競爭對手認為信息溢出成本更高時，他們不太可能共享合伙人。雖然對信息溢出的擔憂顯著降低了產品市場競爭對手共享同一審計合伙人的可能性，但本文發現這種擔憂並沒有阻止他們共享同一審計事務所。最後，本文結果表明，當公司不關心信息溢出時，因為共享合伙人可以降低審計費用和減少會計錯報，從而對公司可能是有益的。

We hypothesize that companies in the same product market avoid sharing the same audit partner when they are concerned about possible information spillovers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that product market rivals are less likely to share the same partner when they perceive that information spillovers are more costly. While concerns about information spillovers significantly reduce the likelihood of product market rivals sharing the same audit partner, we find that such concerns do not deter them from sharing the same audit office. Lastly, when companies are unconcerned with information spillovers, our results suggest that partner sharing can be beneficial because it can result in lower audit fees and fewer accounting misstatements.

論文原文：Kang, J. K. , Lennox, C. , & Pandey, V. . (2021). Client concerns about information spillovers from sharing audit partners. Journal of Accounting and Economics.

8. 內部治理和外部董事與非董事高管的聯繫

董事會與管理層之間的信息不對稱降低了外部董事的監督有效性。外部董事和不在董事會任職的高管之間的聯繫(內部聯繫)可能通過促進關聯方之間的信息共享來幫助克服該種信息不對稱。內部關係還可以讓關聯的高管能夠頂住CEO的壓力，採取可能危及CEO長期聲譽的行動。或者，內部關係可能會讓關聯高管免受不利後果的影響，從而鞏固高管的地位。本文發現，與前者一致，當董事與負責這些領域的高管聯繫時，收益重述、集體訴訟和實際盈餘管理減少。相互關聯的董事會還會在CEO更替、CEO繼任和收購方面做出更好的決定。總體而言，本文結果表明，內部關係與內部治理的改善相關，從而表明董事會可能受益於與非董事高管建立更牢固的關係。

The monitoring effectiveness of outside directors is curtailed by information asymmetry between boards and management. Connections between outside directors and executives who do not serve on the board (internal ties) may help overcome this challenge by facilitating information sharing between the connected parties. Internal ties can also empower connected executives to withstand pressure from CEOs to take actions that might endanger their reputation in the long term. Alternatively, internal ties may entrench executives by insulating connected executives from adverse outcomes. Consistent with the former, we find that earnings restatements, class-action litigations, and real earnings management decrease when directors are connected with executives responsible for these areas. Connected boards also make better decisions related to CEO turnover, CEO succession and acquisitions. Overall, our results show that internal ties are associated with improved internal governance, thereby suggesting that boards may benefit from forging stronger relationships with non-director executives.

論文原文：Uh, A. , & Am, B. . (2021). Internal governance and outside directors' connections to non-director executives. Journal of Accounting and Economics.

9. 什麼時候預測GAAP收益帶來不合理的負擔？

SEC規則要求管理人員將其非GAAP盈利預測與最直接可比的GAAP預測相對照，除非這樣做會導致「不合理的負擔」。大量經理依靠「不合理的負擔例外」來證明排除相對容易預測的經常性收益成分是合理的。本文分析了依賴「不合理的負擔例外」的公司，發現他們的非GAAP盈利預測更有可能排除分析師未排除的重大經常性費用。本文研究結果表明，幾乎三分之一的經理利用「不合理的負擔例外」將重大經常性費用排除在他們的收益指引之外。

SEC rules require managers to reconcile their non-GAAP earnings forecasts with the most directly comparable GAAP forecasts unless doing so would entail 『unreasonable effort.』 A significant number of managers rely on the unreasonable efforts exception to justify the omission of comparable GAAP forecasts. We analyze firms that rely on the unreasonable efforts exception and find that their non-GAAP earnings forecasts are more likely to exclude significant recurring expenses that are not excluded by analysts. Our results suggest that almost a third of managers exploit the unreasonable efforts exception to exclude significant recurring expenses from their earnings guidance.

論文原文：Laurion, H. , & Sloan, R. G. (2021) . When does forecasting gaap earnings entail unreasonable effort?. Social Science Electronic Publishing.

10. 銀行監管機構披露評級的影響

本文研究銀行如何改變其風險管理做法，以應對綜合評估銀行風險承擔能力的監管評級的私下披露。在評級披露後，受影響的銀行提高了其貸款損失撥備的及時性。對於低於關鍵評級門檻的銀行以及總部設在競爭程度較低的州的銀行，這種效應更明顯。在評級披露後，虧損銀行減少了商業貸款，同時將資產轉換為現金。總體而言，本文發現第三方制定和私下披露的業績衡量標準如何影響公司內部的行為。

I examine how banks change their risk management practices in response to the private disclosure of regulatory ratings that summarize bank risk-taking. Upon ratings disclosure, affected banks increase the timeliness of their loan loss provisioning. These effects are concentrated among banks that lie below key rating thresholds and those headquartered in states with low competition. After ratings disclosure, deficient banks decrease commercial lending while shifting assets into cash. Overall, my findings highlight how performance measures produced and privately disclosed by a third party can influence actions within a firm.

論文原文：Y Gopalan. (2021). The effects of ratings disclosure by bank regulators. Journal of Accounting and Economics(2), 101438.