鑽石舞台

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1、貨幣政策的狀態依賴效應：再融資渠道

本文研究貨幣政策的影響如何取決於來自抵押貸款再融資的資金的分配。我們表明，貨幣政策的效力是狀態依賴的，系統性地隨着再融資的潛在資金池的變化而變化。我們構建了一個量化的動態生命周期模型來解釋我們的發現，並使用它來研究消費對抵押貸款利率變動的反應如何取決於再融資資金的分配。這些影響是強狀態依賴的。我們還利用該模型來研究長期低利率對貨幣政策效力的影響。我們發現，這一效力在低利率時期內和利率正常化後的相當長一段時間內都大幅降低。

This paper studies how the impact of monetary policy depends on the distribution of savings from refinancing mortgages. We show that the efficacy of monetary policy is state dependent, varying in a systematic way with the pool of potential savings from refinancing. We construct a quantitative dynamic life-cycle model that accounts for our findings and use it to study how the response of consumption to a change in mortgage rates depends on the distribution of savings from refinancing. These effects are strongly state dependent. We also use the model to study the impact of a long period of low interest rates on the potency of monetary policy. We find that this potency is substantially reduced both during the period and for a substantial amount of time after interest rates renormalize.

參考文獻：Eichenbaum, Martin, Sergio Rebelo, and Arlene Wong. 2022. "State-Dependent Effects of Monetary Policy: The Refinancing Channel." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 721-61.

2、作為國家能力體現的地方精英：剛果民主共和國的城市首領如何利用地方信息提高稅收合規性

本文研究了在低能力國家中，地方首領和國家公務員作為徵稅人的權衡問題。我們研究了一項隨機政策實驗，將一個剛果大城市的街區交給城市首領或國家公務員徵收財產稅。首領徵稅使稅收合規提高了3.2個百分點，增加了44%的收入。首領們收取了更多的賄賂，但並沒有破壞稅德或對政府的信任。混合處理組的結果表明，國家公務員在徵稅前與首領協商，首領通過利用當地信息更有效地針對具有高支付傾向的家庭來實現更高稅收合規性，而不是更有效地說服家庭在被訪後交稅。

This paper investigates the trade-offs between local elites and state agents as tax collectors in low-capacity states. We study a randomized policy experiment assigning neighborhoods of a large Congolese city to property tax collection by city chiefs or state agents. Chief collection raised tax compliance by 3.2 percentage points, increasing revenue by 44 percent. Chiefs collected more bribes but did not undermine tax morale or trust in government. Results from a hybrid treatment arm in which state agents consulted with chiefs before collection suggest that chief collectors achieved higher compliance by using local information to more efficiently target households with high payment propensities, rather than by being more effective at persuading households to pay conditional on having visited them.

參考文獻：Balán, Pablo, Augustin Bergeron, Gabriel Tourek, and Jonathan L. Weigel. 2022. "Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 762-97.

3、虛構金錢，真實成本：財務問題突出性對弱勢學生的影響

當隨機進行一項財務問題為主的數學考試時，弱勢學生群體表現地更差。對於社會經濟指標低於全國中位數的學生群體來說，財務主題問題的比例每增加10個百分點，他們的考試成績就會下降0.026個標準差，約占與其他學生成績差距的6%。使用問題層面的數據，通過比較財務問題和高度相似的非財務問題下的成績，確認了財務問題突出性的作用。利用問題的隨機排序，我確定了其對後續問題的影響，提供了證據表明貧困的注意力捕獲效應會影響實驗環境之外的政策相關結果。

Disadvantaged students perform differentially worse when randomly given a financially salient mathematics exam. For students with socioeconomic indicators below the national median, a 10 percentage point increase in the share of monetary themed questions depresses exam performance by 0.026 standard deviations, about 6 percent of their performance gap. Using question-level data, I confirm the role of financial salience by comparing performance on monetary and highly similar non-monetary questions. Leveraging the randomized ordering of questions, I identify an effect on subsequent questions, providing evidence that the attention capture effects of poverty affect policy relevant outcomes outside of experimental settings.

參考文獻：Duquennois, Claire. 2022. "Fictional Money, Real Costs: Impacts of Financial Salience on Disadvantaged Students." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 798-826.

4、種族問題對警察使用武力有影響嗎？911報警電話的證據

本文使用兩個城市160萬個911電話的數據來研究種族和警察使用武力的情況，這兩個城市都不允許在警察調度中使用自由裁量權。結果表明，當被派往擁有更多少數族裔的社區時，白人警察比少數族裔警察更多地使用武力。估計結果表明，如果白人警察與少數族裔警察一樣增加武力，黑人(西班牙裔)平民遭遇暴力的可能性要高55%(75%)，遭遇警察槍擊的可能性要高5倍。此外，與我們的統計基準相比，14%的白人警察在黑人社區過度使用武力。

This paper examines race and police use of force using data on 1.6 million 911 calls in two cities, neither of which allows for discretion in officer dispatch. Results indicate White officers increase force much more than minority officers when dispatched to more minority neighborhoods. Estimates indicate Black (Hispanic) civilians are 55 (75) percent more likely to experience any force, and five times as likely to experience a police shooting, compared to if White officers scaled up force similarly to minority officers. Additionally, 14 percent of White officers use excess force in Black neighborhoods relative to our statistical benchmark.

參考文獻：Hoekstra, Mark, and CarlyWill Sloan. 2022. "Does Race Matter for Police Use of Force? Evidence from 911 Calls." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 827-60.

5、利用社區信息鎖定高能力企業家：實地的機制設計

由於缺乏可核實的信息，在低收入國家識別高增長的小企業家仍然是一項挑戰。通過在印度進行的現金資助實驗，我們證明了社區知識可以幫助鎖定高增長的小企業家。在我們的樣本中資本的平均邊際回報率是每月9.4%，而據報告，社區中排名前三分之一的小企業家每月的資本邊際回報率估計在24%到30%之間。此外，我們發現有證據表明，當社區成員能夠影響資源分配時，他們會曲解自己的預測。最後，我們證明了簡單的機制可以重新調整對真實報告的激勵。

Identifying high-growth microentrepreneurs in low-income countries remains a challenge due to a scarcity of verifiable information. With a cash grant experiment in India we demonstrate that community knowledge can help target high-growth microentrepreneurs; while the average marginal return to capital in our sample is 9.4 percent per month, microentrepreneurs reported in the top third of the community are estimated to have marginal returns to capital between 24 percent and 30 percent per month. Further we find evidence that community members distort their predictions when they can influence the distribution of resources. Finally, we demonstrate that simple mechanisms can realign incentives for truthful reporting.

參考文獻：Hussam, Reshmaan, Natalia Rigol, and Benjamin N. Roth. 2022. "Targeting High Ability Entrepreneurs Using Community Information: Mechanism Design in the Field." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 861-98.

6、重塑青少年的性別態度：來自印度學校實驗的證據

本文評估了在印度進行的一項干預措施，該干預讓青少年參與為期兩年的關於性別平等的課堂討論，旨在減少他們對限制婦女和女孩機會的社會規範的支持。通過隨機對照試驗，我們發現，該項目使態度對性別平等的支持度提高了0.18個標準差，或者說，相當於將16%的退步態度轉化為支持。當我們在干預結束兩年後重新對研究參與者進行調查時，其效果依然存在。該項目還導致了更多性別平等的自我報告行為，我們發現有微弱證據表明它影響了兩個顯示性偏好的測度。

This paper evaluates an intervention in India that engaged adolescent girls and boys in classroom discussions about gender equality for two years, aiming to reduce their support for societal norms that restrict women's and girls' opportunities. Using a randomized controlled trial, we find that the program made attitudes more supportive of gender equality by 0.18 standard deviations, or, equivalently, converted 16 percent of regressive attitudes. When we resurveyed study participants two years after the intervention had ended, the effects had persisted. The program also led to more gender-equal self-reported behavior, and we find weak evidence that it affected two revealed-preference measures.

參考文獻：Dhar, Diva, Tarun Jain, and Seema Jayachandran. 2022. "Reshaping Adolescents' Gender Attitudes: Evidence from a School-Based Experiment in India." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 899-927.

7、錯誤設定的政治以及民粹主義的復發

我們建立了一個兩組人進行政治競爭的動態模型，這兩組人在為實現共同結果的數據生成過程的主觀模型上存在差異。其中一組人的模型比另一組簡單，因為他們忽略了一些相關的政策變量。我們的政策表明，政策周期必然會出現，而簡單的世界觀——可以被解釋為民粹主義世界觀——意味着極端的政策選擇。在那些擁有更複雜模型的人治理的時期，更簡單世界觀的設定錯誤有所增加，導致後者高估了一些極端政策行動的積極影響。

We develop a dynamic model of political competition between two groups that differ in their subjective model of the data generating process for a common outcome. One group has a simpler model than the other group as they ignore some relevant policy variables. We show that policy cycles must arise and that simple world views—which can be interpreted as populist world views—imply extreme policy choices. Periods in which those with a more complex model govern increase the specification error of the simpler world view, leading the latter to overestimate the positive impact of a few extreme policy actions.

參考文獻：Levy, Gilat, Ronny Razin, and Alwyn Young. 2022. "Misspecified Politics and the Recurrence of Populism." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 928-62.

8、設計最後期限

我研究的是一個組織應該如何管理一個範圍不確定的項目，而這個項目是由一個願意延長僱傭期的私人專家提供建議的。最優的長期合同結合了項目完成的最後期限和獎勵金，獎勵金隨着最後期限的臨近而下降。當企業還可以從產出中了解項目的狀態時，最佳截止日期對產出顯示出不同的敏感性，在項目開始時有一個硬性截止日期，隨着項目績效的下降，截止日期逐漸寬鬆。

I study how an organization should manage a project of uncertain scope, when it is advised by a privately informed expert who prefers to prolong his employment. The optimal long-term contract combines a deadline for project completion and incentive payments which decline as the deadline approaches. When the firm can additionally learn about the project's state from output, the optimal deadline exhibits variable sensitivity to output, with a hard deadline at the outset of the project and increasingly soft deadlines as the project's performance declines.

參考文獻：Madsen, Erik. 2022. "Designing Deadlines." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 963-97.

9、健康保險設計中的僱主激勵和扭曲：對福利和成本的影響

本文研究僱主在設計健康保險供應商網絡時的動機，以及可觀測的供應品是否反映了與雇員一致的偏好。我估計了一個供求模型，在這個模型中，我將僱主在醫院和醫生網絡方面健康計劃的供應進行內生化。我發現，僱主「過度提供」了廣泛的網絡，高估了某些員工的偏好，尤其是年齡較大的和那些在供應商競爭較少地區的員工，而忽略了普通員工家庭的偏好。將僱主轉向在不同地域的市場上提供不同的供應商網絡，可以產生巨大的盈餘收益，其對分配或選擇的影響則最小。

This paper studies employer incentives in designing health insurance provider networks and whether observed offerings reflect preferences that are aligned with employees. I estimate a model of supply and demand where I endogenize employer health plan offerings with respect to hospital and physician networks. I find that employers "overprovide" broad networks by overweighting the preferences of certain employees, specifically older workers and those in regions with less provider competition, over the preferences of the average employee household. Shifting employers toward offering different provider networks in different geographic markets could yield substantial gains to surplus, with minimal distributional or selection effects.

參考文獻：Tilipman, Nicholas. 2022. "Employer Incentives and Distortions in Health Insurance Design: Implications for Welfare and Costs." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 998-1037.

10、評估工作中的社會偏好和禮物交換

我們設計了三個實地實驗來評估員工對僱主的社會偏好如何激勵他們努力工作。我們改變了提供給工人的工資率，給僱主的回報，以及僱主通過意外禮物表現出的慷慨程度。即使在沒有私人激勵的情況下，工人也會努力工作，但他們的努力對僱主回報不敏感。這與「光熱效應」是一致的，但不是純粹的利他主義。禮物對生產率沒有影響，但會帶來加班。這一差異的部分原因是，相比生產率，加班對激勵的反應更靈敏。

We design three field experiments to estimate how workers' social preferences toward their employer motivates their work effort. We vary the pay rates offered to workers, the return to the employer, and employer generosity demonstrated via unexpected gifts. Workers exert effort even without private incentives, but their effort is insensitive to the return to the employer. This is consistent with "warm glow" but not pure altruism. The gifts have no effect on productivity, but engender extra work. This difference is explained partly by the finding that extra work is much more responsive to incentives than is productivity.

參考文獻：DellaVigna, Stefano, John A. List, Ulrike Malmendier, and Gautam Rao. 2022. "Estimating Social Preferences and Gift Exchange at Work." American Economic Review, 112 (3): 1038-74.